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The story goes something like this:1
There was a particularly difficult college professor notorious for a low
grading scale. After years of low grade following low grade, one paper
finally earned a B minus, the highest grade ever awarded by this professor.
Word spread about the paper, and the student author sold it to the highest
bidder, who later turned in the same paper to the same professor and
received a B. The next year, after being recycled yet again, the paper
received a B plus. When the paper was recycled and submitted a fourth
time, it finally received an A and a comment from the professor, “I’ve read
this paper four times now, and I like it better each time.”2
I. INTRODUCTION
The story may be true, but it is more likely a college legend.3 Either
way, this story and others like it4 help reduce the strain of college life and
keep alive the eternal hope of one day outwitting a professor.5 But the
stories also foster an improper sense of ease and comfort with plagiarism.
Recycling another’s paper and resubmitting it does not gradually lead
down the path to higher grades; rather, this is likely an academic violation

1. JAN HAROLD BRUNVAND, CURSES! BROILED AGAIN! THE HOTTEST URBAN LEGENDS
GOING 286–87 (1989).
2. Id. at 287.
3. Id.
4. Consider also the tale of a student who submitted a years-old term paper taken from a file
of ready-made papers kept by his fraternity. Id. Unbeknownst to the student, the professor had been
in the same fraternity as an undergraduate twenty years earlier, and the paper the student submitted
had actually been written by the professor. The student received an A plus and a note from the
professor: “This paper got only a B minus twenty years ago, but I always felt that it was worth
more.” Id.
5. Id. at 288.
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that could lead to failing grades or worse.6
6. See Deborah R. Gerhardt, Plagiarism in Cyberspace: Learning the Rules of Recycling
Content with a View Towards Nurturing Academic Trust in an Electronic World, 12 RICH. J.L. &
TECH. 10, 29–39 (2006) (discussing the consequences of plagiarism and the potential exposure of
plagiarists to copyright liability); Lisa G. Lerman, Misattribution in Legal Scholarship: Plagiarism,
Ghostwriting, and Authorship, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 467, 467 (2001) (“Plagiarism is a capital offense
for law students.”). “Plagiarism is considered by most writers, teachers, journalists, scholars, and
even members of the general public to be the capital intellectual crime.” RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
LITTLE BOOK OF P LAGIARISM 107 (2007). Outside the school setting, the most common
punishments for plagiarism are ostracism, humiliation, and other variations of shaming social
stigmas. Id. at 35–36. One such situation is humorously portrayed in the movie Good Will Hunting.
See GOOD WILL HUNTING (Miramax 1997). In an early scene, Will, the title character, goes to a
Harvard bar with a group of friends. As one of the friends, Chuckie, is flirting with two women at
the bar, an arrogant local student, Clark, approaches and attempts to belittle Chuckie and show off
his superior intellect in front of the women. Will, himself a genius, comes to Chuckie’s aid, quickly
making Clark’s point look silly as the following exchange unfolds:
WILL: Of course that’s your contention. You’re a first-year grad student. You just
got finished readin’ some Marxian historian—Pete Garrison, prob’ly—you’re
gonna be convinced of that till next month when you get to James Lemon; then
you’re gonna be talkin’ about how the economies of Virginia and Pennsylvania
were entrepreneurial and capitalist way back in 1740. That’s gonna last until next
year, you’re gonna be in here regurgitatin’ Gordon Wood, talkin’ about, you
know, the pre-Revolutionary Utopia and the capital-forming effects of military
mobilization.
CLARK: Well, as a matter of fact I won’t because Wood drastically
underestimates the impact of social dis—
WILL: Wood drastically—Wood drastically underestimates the impact of social
distinctions predicated upon wealth, especially inherited wealth. You got that from
Vickers. Work in Essex County, page 98, right? Yeah, I read that too. Were you
gonna plagiarize the whole thing for us? Do you have any thoughts—of your own
on this matter? Or do you, is that your thing? You come into a bar, you read some
obscure passage, and then pretend you, you—pawn it off as your own—as your
own idea, just to impress some girls? Embarrass my friend? See the sad thing
about a guy like you is in fifty years you’re gonna start doing some thinkin’ on
your own, and you’re gonna come up with the fact that there are two certainties
in life: one, don’t do that, and, two, you dropped a hundred and fifty grand on
a[n] . . . education you coulda’ got for a dollar fifty in late charges at the public
library.
CLARK: Yeah, but I will have a degree. And you’ll be serving my kids fries at a
drive-through on our way to a skiin’ trip.
WILL: Yeah, maybe. Eh, but at least I won’t be unoriginal.
Id. Soon after, Skylar, one of the women at the bar—obviously impressed by Will and disgusted
by Clark—approaches Will and introduces herself. Later that night, the social implications of the
prior event become abundantly clear. As Will and his friends are leaving the bar, they notice Clark
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In a “cut-and-paste”7 Internet environment where plagiarism is easier
than ever, academic institutions face the daunting challenges of promoting
honesty and respect for the work of others and of ensuring the integrity of
the learning and grading processes. Many academic institutions have
accordingly turned to commercial plagiarism prevention and detection
services, such as those provided by a company called Turnitin.8 Yet those
institutions that use the Turnitin system may be fostering infringement of
the intellectual property rights of their students. When Virginia’s McLean
High School recently announced plans to use Turnitin, students balked and
collected 1,190 student signatures on a petition that opposed mandatory
use of the system, because that use of Turnitin would infringe their
intellectual property rights by automatically adding their essays to the
company’s massive database.9 In response, school officials backed off a
plan to require students in all grades to submit essays to Turnitin, deciding
instead to phase in use of Turnitin by making it mandatory only for ninthand tenth-grade students in specified classes.10 As one student stated, “‘It
seems they pretty much changed the policy so they don’t have to deal with
the people who are protesting it.’”11
But as the plagiarism problem grows12 and questions about the legality
and effectiveness of the Turnitin system linger and extend far beyond
McLean High School,13 the academic world will be able to dodge the
problem only for so long.14 Part II of this Note examines the plagiarism
through the window of a coffee shop. Will walks up to the window, knocks to get Clark’s attention,
and asks Clark if he likes apples. After an answer in the affirmative, Will slams a napkin against
the window, boasting, “Yeah? Well I got her number. How do ya like dem apples?” Id. As Judge
Posner explains (in a slightly more scholarly tone than Good Will Hunting), “The stigma of
plagiarism seems never to fade completely, not because it is an especially heinous offense but
because it is embarrassingly second rate; its practitioners are pathetic, almost ridiculous.” POSNER,
supra, at 37.
7. See infra notes 15, 17–18 and accompanying text.
8. See Turnitin, Home Page, http://turnitin.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2007). For the origins
and workings of the Turnitin system, see infra Part III.
9. Maria Glod, Students Rebel Against Database Designed to Thwart Plagiarists, WASH.
POST, Sept. 22, 2006, at A1 [hereinafter Glod, Students Rebel].
10. Maria Glod, Score One for McLean High Students: Administration Amends Anti-Cheating
Policy After Protests, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2006, at B1 [hereinafter Glod, Score One].
11. Id. (quoting Nicholas Kaylor, a senior at McLean High School).
12. See id.
13. See Glod, Students Rebel, supra note 9.
14. Indeed, the McLean incident may be the event that breaks the ice and starts the judicial
process that will eventually resolve the legal issues presented by the use of Turnitin or other similar
services. On March 27, 2007, several students filed the first copyright complaint against
iParadigms, Turnitin’s parent company, see infra notes 33–34 and accompanying text, in the U. S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. See Follow the Case,
http://www.dontturnitin.com/followthecase.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2007); see also Maria Glod,
McLean Students Sue Anti-Cheating Service; Plaintiffs Say Company’s Database of Term Papers,
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problem facing the academic world; Part III examines the origins and
workings of the Turnitin system; Part IV analyzes the copyright issues
raised by Turnitin’s service and examines the broader question whether
plagiarism prevention justifies deferential treatment in a fair use inquiry;
Part V examines further implications of the copyright analysis; Part VI
examines Turnitin’s effectiveness; and Part VII provides alternative
solutions to the plagiarism problem.
II. THE PLAGIARISM PROBLEM
A. The Prevalence of Plagiarism
Educators agree that plagiarism is a growing problem that is
exacerbated by the ease with which students can cut and paste from
multiple online sources.15 Research by the Center for Academic Integrity16

Essays Violates Copyright Laws, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2007, at B5. On April 16, 2007, prior to
any responsive pleading, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. See Amended Complaint for
Copyright Infringement, Vanderhye ex rel. A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, No. 07-0293 (E.D. Va. Apr.
9, 2007), available at http://www.dontturnitin.com/images/iParadigms_Amended_Complaint.pdf.
For its part, iParadigms had previously filed a complaint for declaratory relief in the U. S. District
Court for the Northern District of California. See Complaint for Declaratory Relief, iParadigms,
LLC v. McLean Comm. for Student Rights, No. C06-07493 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2006), available at
http://www.dontturnitin.com/images/Filing.pdf. However, according to the students’ amended
complaint, iParadigms has withdrawn its complaint for declaratory relief. Amended Complaint for
Copyright Infringement, supra, at 5–6. On May 11, 2007, the Honorable Claude M. Hilton, the
district court judge presiding over the case in the Eastern District of Virginia, denied iParadigms’s
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, ruling that the students properly stated a claim upon
which relief could be granted. See Order, Vanderhye ex rel. A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, No. 07-0293
(E.D. Va. May 11, 2007), available at http://www.dontturnitin.com/images/Court_Denial_of_
iParadigms_Motion_to_Dismiss.pdf.
15. See Glod, Score One, supra note 10. This agreement is not unanimous, however.
“Plagiarism is attracting increasing attention,” writes Judge Posner, “though whether this is because
it is becoming more common, or because its boundaries are becoming vague and contested, or
because it is being detected more often . . . are among the many questions about it that call for
investigation.” POSNER, supra note 6, at 9. Some educators feel that the fear of plagiarism is blown
out of proportion and that plagiarism is not on the rise. See Brian Hansen, Combating Plagiarism,
13 CQ RESEARCHER 773, 778 (2003). For a discussion of a (slightly dated) study by two Rochester
Institute of Technology professors who concluded that there is not yet a plagiarism epidemic and
that reports of increasing plagiarism due to the prevelance of Internet use are exaggerated, see Alex
P. Kellogg, Students Plagiarize Online Less than Many Think, a New Study Finds, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Feb. 15, 2002, at A44.
16. The Center for Academic Integrity, associated with the Rutland Institute for Ethics at
Clemson University, is a consortium of more than 360 institutions. The Ctr. for Academic Integrity,
About Us, http://www.academicintegrity.org/about_us/index.php (last visited Nov. 15, 2007). The
Center seeks to “provide resources and catalyze commitment to academic integrity in educational
institutions, with emphasis on higher and secondary education.” The Ctr. for Academic Integrity,
Mission Statement, http://www.academicintegrity.org/about_us/mission.php (last visited Nov. 15,
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shows that while 10% of undergraduate students admitted to “cut-andpaste plagiarism”17 in 1999, almost 40% admitted to such behavior in
studies conducted since 2002.18 The research also shows that 70% of
students believe such cheating is not a serious issue.19 Half of the
undergraduate students surveyed admitted to one or more instances of
“serious cheating” on written assignments.20 In a study of high-school
students, 60% admitted to some form of plagiarism.21 Indeed, plagiarism
appears to be part of a larger culture of cheating: one study of high-school
students revealed that 80% admitted to having cheated at least once, half
said cheating was not necessarily wrong, and 95% of those who had
cheated said they had never been caught.22 In recent years, the media have
documented several plagiarism scandals at leading academic institutions.23
Augmenting the escalation of student plagiarism is the difficulty and
inconvenience that teachers often face in proving that a student has
actually plagiarized.24

2007).
17. For purposes of this study, the term “cut-and-paste plagiarism” referred to “using a
sentence or two (or more) from different sources on the Internet and weaving this information
together into a paper without appropriate citation.” The Ctr. for Academic Integrity, CAI Research
(copy of archived website on file with author). The Center for Academic Integrity recently moved
to Clemson University, and its new website is still under revision. See generally The Ctr. for
Academic Integrity, Home, http://www.academicintegrity.org/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2007).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Carolyn Kleiner & Mary Lord, The Cheating Game: ‘Everyone’s Doing It,’ from
Grade School to Graduate School, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 22, 1999, at 54, 56. While this
culture of cheating is not confined to academia, the remedy to cheating in society at large may be
to stop it at its roots, which lie in the academic world. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron
Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937,
975 n.201 (2003) (noting that imposing higher ethical standards on students may be the cure for
future white-collar crime (citing Miguel Roig, Letter to the Editor, In School, at Work, Lessons in
Cheating, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2002, at A26)).
23. See, e.g., Plagiarism Investigation Ends at Virginia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2002, at A24
(reporting a plagiarism scandal at the University of Virginia that led to the dismissal of forty-five
students and the revocation of three graduate degrees); Kelly Simmons, Student Cheating Taking
New Tack; Some May Be Honest Mistakes, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 20, 2002, at C1 (describing
a plagiarism investigation at Georgia Tech involving 187 students); Robert Tomsho, Familiar
Words: Student Plagiarism Stirs Controversy at Ohio University, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2006, at
A1 (chronicling a plagiarism scandal at Ohio University).
24. See THOMAS MALLON, STOLEN WORDS: FORAYS INTO THE ORIGINS AND RAVAGES OF
PLAGIARISM 95 (1989) (analogizing a faculty member who brings a plagiarism charge to a rape
victim who comes forward only to be grilled by a defense lawyer: “Admit it! You wanted her to
plagiarize!”). Additionally, academic institutions, fearing litigation, often hesitate to take action
against students caught plagiarizing. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 39. Most plagiarism litigation
is initiated “by rather than against” students disciplined for plagiarism. Id.; see also Brian Hansen,

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol60/iss1/5

6

Horovitz: Two Wrongs Don't Negate a Copyright: Don't Make Students Turnitin

2008]

TW O WRO N G S D O N ’T N EG ATE A C O PYRIG H T

235

B. The Harms of Plagiarism
To comprehend fully the plagiarism problem, one must examine not
only plagiarism’s prevalence but also its harms. Plagiarism is difficult to
define;25 one commentator’s search for a definition of plagiarism led him
to combine four metaphors that nicely highlight the harms of plagiarism.26
Plagiarism can appropriately be viewed as stealing,27 as an ethical
violation,28 as borrowing without returning,29 or as intellectual laziness.30
Additionally, plagiarism “undermines the academic environment” by
denying proper credit to original authors, by preventing professors from
accurately grading and evaluating work, by giving students who plagiarize
an unfair advantage over their honest colleagues, and by preventing
students from progressing academically.31 Perhaps worst of all, plagiarism
precludes the evolution of scholarship by destroying trust in academic
integrity.32

Confronting Plagiarism Can Pose Risk, 13 CQ RESEARCHER 779, 779 (2003) (chronicling the
struggles faced by educators who accused students of plagiarism).
25. Laurie Stearns suggests that plagiarism may be difficult to articulately define, but, like
pornography, people “know it when they see it.” See Laurie Stearns, Copy Wrong: Plagiarism,
Process, Property, and the Law, in PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN A POSTMODERN WORLD 5, 7 (Lise Buranen & Alice M. Roy eds., 1999).
26. See David Leight, Plagiarism as Metaphor, in PERSPECTIVES ON P LAGIARISM AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A POSTMODERN WORLD, supra note 25, at 221, 221.
27. “By defining plagiarism in this sense, words become metaphorically ‘owned’ by someone
else, a kind of property in which the worst form of dishonesty and immorality is in the taking of
them.” Id. at 222.
28. “In this case, the ‘profession’ is that of student, and the ethical violation is the shirking
of one’s responsibilities as a learner by using the work of another.” Id. at 223.
29. “Since the plagiarist cannot in any sense ‘put the item back’—one cannot return words
to their original source—the good writer should give ‘credit’ to the source.” Id. at 225. In this sense,
the plagiarist borrows not only the words but also the due credit and acknowledgment owed the
original author. Id.
30. “[T]he plagiarist avoids doing valuable intellectual work that would help not only him
or her but the entire academy as well.” Id. at 227.
31. See Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, Honor System: What is Plagiarism?,
http://honor.unc.edu/students/plagiarism.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2007).
32. See Gerhardt, supra note 6, at 3. Nonetheless, some argue that cut-and-paste plagiarism
is not as harmful as it is portrayed. See Essay Copying is ‘Self-Teaching,’ BBC NEWS, Apr. 4, 2004,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/education/3598161.stm. While full-blown
plagiarism is always a problem, small-scale copying can actually demonstrate comprehension of
the subject. See id. Thus, one educator argues that taking material off the Internet and rewording
it is a form of self-teaching that allows students to learn the material, which would not be possible
without mastery of the subject. See id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2008

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 5

236

FLO RID A LAW REVIEW

[V ol. 60

III. TURNITIN
A. The Origins of Turnitin
John Barrie, a former student at the University of California, Berkeley,
and the current president and CEO of iParadigms, the company behind
Turnitin, developed the core Turnitin technology in 1994.33 In 1996,
iParadigms was born when its founders used a series of computer
programs to track the recycling of research papers in large undergraduate
classes.34 Teaming with a group of mathematicians, computer scientists,
and teachers, the group formed Plagiarism.org, which by 1998 had become
an established Internet-based plagiarism detection service.35 Today,
Plagiarism.org consists of Turnitin and iThenticate,36 which iParadigms
boasts as the Internet’s “most widely used and trusted resources for
preventing the spread of internet plagiarism.”37 Millions of students and
faculty in more than eighty-five countries use Turnitin, which receives
thousands of student papers daily.38 The company’s clients include
33. See Turnitin, Company: About Us, http://turnitin.com/static/company.html (last visited
Nov. 15, 2007); Turnitin, Executive Bios, http://turnitin.com/static/bios.html (last visited Nov. 15,
2007). The use of a computerized plagiarism detection device is not new. Several years before
Barrie developed the Turnitin technology, Walter Stewart and Dr. Ned Feder were already using
a “plagiarism machine” to detect plagiarism in science literature. See Philip J. Hilts, Plagiarists
Take Note: Machine’s on Guard, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1992, at C1. Interestingly, but not altogether
surprisingly, scientists viewed the plagiarism machine with a reticence similar to that which
students express toward Turnitin today; one critic called the plagiarism machine “chilling” and
another griped that the technology at issue seemed more suited for use by the C.I.A. or Interpol than
by plagiarism detectors. Id.
34. See Turnitin, Company: About Us, supra note 33.
35. Id.
36. Whereas Turnitin is designed to prevent plagiarism in the academic world, see supra note
8 and accompanying text, iThenticate is designed to allow corporations, publishers, and law firms
to check documents and manuscripts for originality and to see if any of those entities’ intellectual
property is being misappropriated on the Internet, iThenticate, Home Page,
http://ithenticate.com/static/home.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2007).
37. See Turnitin, Company: About Us, supra note 33.
38. See Turnitin, Executive Bios, supra note 33. While the Turnitin website indicates that the
company receives nearly 40,000 student papers a day, see id., recent articles report the number of
student papers submitted daily to be 120,000, see Linda L. Briggs, Turnitin: Fighting Plagiarism
and Saving Time at Fresno State, CAMPUS TECH., Mar. 14, 2007, available at
http://www.campustechnology.com/articles/45391; Douglas MacMillan, Looking over Turnitin’s
Shoulder, B US . W K . O NLINE , Mar. 13, 2007, available at http://www.businessweek.com/
technology/content/mar2007/tc20070313_733103.htm. As evidence that the news stories are a more
accurate reflection of Turnitin’s current figures (and as evidence of Turnitin’s rapid growth), see
Press Release, Thomson Corp., Thomson Higher Education Becomes Exclusive Educational
Distributor of Turnitin® Online Originality Tracker (Aug. 5, 2005), available at
http://www.lexdon.com/article/Thomson_Higher_Education_Becomes_Exclusive/350.html.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol60/iss1/5

8

Horovitz: Two Wrongs Don't Negate a Copyright: Don't Make Students Turnitin

2008]

TW O WRO N G S D O N ’T N EG ATE A C O PYRIG H T

237

Georgetown University, University of Florida, Rutgers University, Hofstra
University, University of California Los Angeles, and more than 90% of
all colleges and universities in the United Kingdom.39 Thus, while the
plagiarism problems described in the preceding Part provided only
headaches for academics, they also provided opportunities for
entrepreneurs like Turnitin founder John Barrie. The more demanding the
problem, the more profitable the solution: Turnitin, which sells individual
licenses, department licenses, single-campus licenses, and multiplecampus licenses,40 nets earnings that exceed $10 million per year.41 Profits
figure only to rise in the near future; iParadigms’ membership has doubled
in each of the last seven years, and the company expects to sign 100,000
new clients in the next ten years.42
B. How It Works
For comparison purposes, Turnitin applies mathematical algorithms to
each paper it receives to create a “digital fingerprint” of the paper.43
Turnitin then checks for plagiarism by creating a “customized Originality
Report” for each paper it receives.44 To create this report, Turnitin
compares the digital fingerprint of the submitted paper to other sources
and checks for originality45 based on “exhaustive searches” of three
database types: (1) current and archived Internet documents,46 (2)

At the date of the press release, Turnitin received more than 40,000 student papers per day, but the
figure was projected to escalate to more than 100,000 student papers per day by the end of 2006.
Id. The company’s Complaint for Declaratory Relief also estimates nearly 100,000 student
submissions per day. See Complaint for Declaratory Relief, supra note 14, at 2, 5.
39. See Turnitin, Selected Client List, http://turnitin.com/static/clientlist.html (last visited
Nov. 15, 2007).
40. See Turnitin, Pricing: How to Buy, http://turnitin.com/static/price.html (last visited Nov.
15, 2007).
41. See Hollister Kids, Newspapers Plus, High-Tech Efforts to Stop Cheating Spark a Debate
o n S t ud ent Pap ers, D E T R O I T N E W S P A P E R S I N E D U C . , Oc t. 9 , 2 0 0 6 ,
http://nieonline.com/detroit/plus.cfm?lessondate=20061009; Randy Dotinga, Electronic Snoops
Tackle Copiers, WIRED NEWS, Apr. 2, 2004, http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2004/04/
62906.
42. See MacMillan, supra note 38.
43. See Turnitin, Turnitin Legal Document 6, http://turnitin.com/static/pdf/us_Legal_
Document.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2007).
44. Turnitin, Plagiarism Prevention, http://turnitin.com/static/plagiarism.html (last visited
Nov. 15, 2007).
45. Id.; see Turnitin Legal Document, supra note 43, at 6.
46. Turnitin, Plagiarism Prevention, supra note 44. Turnitin uses a web crawler to archive
“any publicly accessible documents up to 2 MB in size.” See Turnitin, The Broadest Search:
Turnitin Outperforms Search Engines, http://turnitin.com/static/pdf/datasheet_search.pdf (last
visited Nov. 15, 2007) [hereinafter Turnitin, The Broadest Search]; see also Turnitin, TurnitinBot
General Information Page, http://turnitin.com/robot/crawlerinfo.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2007)
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“millions” of Turnitin’s previously submitted student papers,47 and (3)
journal articles and periodicals found in other commercial databases.48 For
each submission, Turnitin provides the teacher with a detailed originality
report, which highlights text that matches another source in the database.49
Turnitin stresses that its system does not determine whether a student has
plagiarized.50 Instead, the system simply highlights for teachers any
matches found in the databases and provides teachers the sources of the
matches; teachers must then make their own determinations regarding
plagiarism.51
IV. COPYRIGHT
A. Copyright Basics
Constitutionally authorized52 and statutorily implemented,53 copyright
law balances the rights of authors and the rights of the public.54 As an
incentive to create new works, copyright law provides the creator of a new
work, for a limited period, a set of exclusive rights to the work.55
(providing information about Turnitin’s web crawling robot, TurnitinBot). Although this Note takes
no stance regarding the legality of Turnitin’s web crawler or archiving of Internet pages, it is worth
noting, as a starting point tangential to those issues, that a district court in Nevada has ruled that
Google’s caching feature, which allows users to view archival copies of websites that would
otherwise be unavailable, does not constitute copyright infringement. See Field v. Google Inc., 412
F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1115 (D. Nev. 2006).
47. Turnitin, Plagiarism Prevention, supra note 44. Turnitin refers to this database as its own
“proprietary database of millions of previously submitted student papers.” Id. According to the
Turnitin Legal Document, only the fingerprints of archived works are checked in the comparison.
See Turnitin Legal Document, supra note 43, at 8. The implications of archiving, the
“fingerprinting” process, and discrepancies between the Turnitin Legal Document and other
Turnitin publications are all addressed more thoroughly in Part IV, infra.
48. Turnitin, Plagiarism Prevention, supra note 44.
49. Id.; see Turnitin, Sample Originality Report, http://turnitin.com/static/images/props/
sample_report.gif (last visited Nov. 15, 2007).
50. Turnitin, Copyright and Privacy: Turnitin Promotes Fairness and Integrity,
http://turnitin.com/static/pdf/datasheet_ip.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2007).
51. Id.
52. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power to “promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
53. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101–1332 (West 2007).
54. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1994) (“‘The limited scope of the
copyright holder’s statutory monopoly . . . reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public
interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately
serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.’”
(omission in original) (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975))).
55. See Mazur v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the
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Copyrights protect original works of authorship.56 Copyrights need not be
registered because rights vest as soon as the work is fixed in a “tangible
medium of expression.”57 Copyright ownership initially vests with the
work’s author.58 Copyright owners receive several exclusive rights,59
including, most relevant to this Note’s discussion, the exclusive right to
reproduce a copy of the copyrighted work and the exclusive right to
prepare a derivative work based on the copyrighted work.60 Copyright
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents
of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“The monopoly privileges that Congress may
authorize . . . . [are] intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the
provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after
the limited period of exclusive control has expired.”).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
57. Id.
58. Id. § 201(a). There is an exception concerning works made for hire. See id. § 201(b) (“In
the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared
is considered the author for purposes of this title . . . .”). A work made for hire is either

(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment;
or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a
collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a
translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as
a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in
a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work
made for hire.
Id. § 101. This exception generally would not apply to student works, however. The second
provision is inapplicable absent express written agreement. Id. Regarding the first provision, while
the terms “employment” and “scope of employment” are not defined in the Copyright Act, the U.S.
Supreme Court has noted that Congress intended to describe the conventional employer–employee
relationship as understood by the general common law of agency. See Cmty. for Creative NonViolence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1989). The Court listed several factors used to determine
whether a hired party is an employee under the common law of agency, see id. at 751–52, but
because students neither meet the initial label as a hired party nor fall within the conventional
understanding of the employer–employee relationship, the exception does not apply to them.
59. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 106–122 (West 2007).
60. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. IV 2004).
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based
upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease, or lending; (4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly; (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
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ownership may be transferred in whole or in part, by conveyance or by
operation of law.61 The exclusive rights that accompany copyright
ownership may be transferred and owned separately.62 Anyone who
violates any of the exclusive rights given to the copyright owner infringes
the copyright.63
In making an infringement determination, there are some important
limitations on the exclusive rights provided to authors.64 Most notably,
notwithstanding the general announcement of exclusive rights given to an
author, the “fair use” of a copyrighted work is deemed to be noninfringing.65 The copyright statutes provide the basic framework within
which the specific issues presented by Turnitin’s use of student-authored
works must be analyzed. This Note examines the specific issues below, but
because Turnitin does not contest that it copies and archives studentauthored works and seemingly concedes a prima facie showing of
copyright infringement, the ultimate infringement analysis hinges on a
single, outcome-determinative inquiry: Is Turnitin’s use of studentauthored works a fair use?66
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works,
including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to
display the copyrighted work publicly; and (6) in the case of sound recordings, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
Id.
61. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1).
62. Id. § 201(d)(2).
63. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (Supp. IV 2004). If a court finds infringement, the remedies may
include injunctive relief, 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004), and costs and attorney’s fees,
17 U.S.C. § 505 (2000).
64. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 107–112 (West 2007). One limitation that at first blush might seem
applicable, but upon further review does not apply to Turnitin, is the limitation of exclusive rights
that affords extra protection to copying by libraries or archives. See id. § 108. Although the
Copyright Act does not define the terms “library” or “archive,” it does outline specific conditions
from which “we can deduce that for purposes of § 108, a library or archive is a collection of
copyrighted works which the public or persons doing research in a specialized field might wish to
copy, presumptively for private study, scholarship, or research, at no cost beyond the cost of
copying.” Scott J. Burnham, Copyright in Library-Held Materials: A Decision Tree for Librarians,
96 LAW LIBR. J. 425, 438–39 (2004). Because Turnitin’s “archive” is not open to the public or
persons within a specialized field and because charges for access to the Turnitin archive exceed the
simple cost of copying, Turnitin’s archive does not qualify as a § 108 archive and is thus ineligible
for heightened protection. See id.
65. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
66. This Note frequently refers to Turnitin’s use of student works. It bears emphasizing,
however, that the infringing activity is either the copying of the works or the creation of derivative
works in the form of digital fingerprints. Unlike patent law, copyright law does not give owners the
right to exclude others from using the copyrighted work. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.18[A] (rev. vol. 2007) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].
This point raises two issues. First, it raises the issue whether copying for the purpose of using is an
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infringement. Although “the Copyright Act does not expressly prohibit ‘use’ per se, . . . neither
does it expressly immunize ‘use’ per se.” Id. § 2.18 [C][2]. For a detailed analysis of why
“[n]othing in either the present Copyright Act or in prior copyright laws justifies the . . . doctrine
that copying for purposes of use (as distinguished from copying for purposes of explanation) is not
an act of infringement,” see id. The second issue raised is whether the copying or fingerprinting is
even infringing. Assuming, as this Note does, that the initial copying or fingerprinting is justified
as part of an implied license, it is arguably the use to which that copy or fingerprint is later
put—archiving—that extends beyond the scope of an implied license and not the act of copying.
This muddies the infringement analysis because it is the copying or fingerprinting that must be
viewed as the infringing activity, not the subsequent use. If the copying or fingerprinting is within
the scope of an implied license, the basis for infringement collapses. One potential response to this
issue is that just because the copying or fingerprinting is done for two purposes, the fact that one
purpose falls within an implied license does not mean that the same act, insofar as it is also done
for the other purpose, cannot be infringing. Furthermore, arguing that the use and not the copying
or fingerprinting exceeds the scope of an implied license concedes that the license has been
exceeded and at the very least invites breach-of-contract litigation, hardly freeing Turnitin of all
liability. Ultimately, under this analysis, whether the cause of action should be brought as a
copyright or contract claim turns on whether the violation is a breach of a covenant or of a
condition of the license. As the Ninth Circuit has stated,
Generally, a “copyright owner who grants a nonexclusive license to use [the]
copyrighted material waives [the] right to sue the licensee for copyright
infringement” and [must instead] sue only for breach of contract. If, however, a
license is limited in scope and the licensee acts outside the scope [of the license],
the licensor can bring an action for copyright infringement.
Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted)
(quoting Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir. 1998)). Thus, “[i]f the grantee’s improper
conduct constitutes a breach of a covenant undertaken by the grantee . . . and if such covenant
constitutes an enforcible contractual obligation, then the grantor will have a cause of action for
breach of contract.” 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra, § 10.15[A] (footnotes omitted). But “[i]f the
nature of a licensee’s violation consists of a failure to satisfy a condition to the license . . . , any use
by the licensee is without authority from the licensor and may therefore, constitute an infringement
of copyright,” and likewise, “when a license is limited in scope, exploitation of the copyrighted
work outside the specified limits constitutes infringement.” Id. One court—albeit in a factual
scenario involving direct dealings between two parties accompanied by an express contract and thus
markedly different from that presented by Turnitin—has suggested that conditions precedent are
disfavored in implied licenses. See Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 559 n.7 (9th Cir.
1990). Because of this suggestion, the more appropriate path to a copyright claim seems to lie in
the argument that any implied license to teachers or to Turnitin is limited in scope and that
Turnitin’s commercial exploitation of the work is outside that scope. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
supra, § 10.15[A].
Once free of these initial hurdles, the nature of Turnitin’s use, which is not itself the infringing
activity, becomes paramount because the fair use defense can absolve otherwise infringing activity
based on the nature of the use. In sum, Turnitin’s use is relevant not because it is infringing but
because it is not fair and it exceeds the scope of any implied license. Further, because Turnitin’s
use is not fair and it exceeds the scope of any implied license, Turnitin’s copying of a student’s
work (and perhaps its creation of a derivative work via fingerprinting) remains infringing.
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B. General Copyright Analysis of Turnitin
When analyzing Turnitin, it is helpful to break down Turnitin’s process
into several stages—document submission, fingerprinting, originality
evaluation, and archiving—and discuss the copyright issues at each
stage.67
1. Document Submission
Initial document submission to Turnitin is justified, the company
argues, by an implied license from student to teacher to “comment on,
criticize and otherwise evaluate the academic quality of . . . both the
work’s content and integrity.”68 This justification may be valid, but it does
little to resolve the ultimate copyright issues. Even if there were no
implied license, the same aspects of the Turnitin system that would be
within the scope of an implied license are also likely a fair use.69 The
problem for Turnitin, as described below, is that those aspects of
Turnitin’s system that reach beyond the scope of any implied license70 are
the same aspects most likely not to be considered a fair use.71
2. Fingerprinting
Turnitin’s fingerprinting72 of student works presents an interesting issue
that is worthy of a brief discussion, even though it too may have little
practical effect on the ultimate infringement analysis. Copyright law gives
an original author the exclusive right “to prepare derivative works based

67. Recognizing the abundance of legal issues surrounding its system, Turnitin has taken a
proactive legal stance and, with the services of the law firm Foley & Lardner, LLP, created a
document outlining its position concerning various legal issues. See Turnitin Legal Document,
supra note 43. For ease of comparison, this subsection, which draws heavily from and comments
on arguments and cases presented in the document, imitates, to the extent practical, the
organizational structure of the document. Although the document discusses additional legal issues
concerning Turnitin, such as compliance with the Child Online Privacy Protection Act, see id. at
9, and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, see id. at 2, 6–8, this Note, focusing
primarily on copyright, does not address these issues. For those interested in investigating the noncopyright legal issues raised by Turnitin’s system, this document may serve as a helpful starting
point.
68. See id. at 4.
69. See infra Part IV.C.
70. “Since a nonexclusive license does not transfer ownership of the copyright from the
licensor to the licensee, the licensor can still bring suit for copyright infringement if the licensee’s
use goes beyond the scope of the nonexclusive license.” MacLean Assocs., Inc. v. Wm. M. MercerMeidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d 769, 779 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen,
908 F.2d 555, 558 n.5 (9th Cir. 1990)).
71. See infra Part IV.C.
72. See Turnitin Legal Document, supra note 43, at 6.
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upon the copyrighted work.”73 A derivative work is defined in part as “a
work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation,
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or
any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”74
Turnitin argues that because the fingerprint does not contain any of the
actual contents of the original work, the fingerprint is not a “true
derivative” of the work.75 The argument rests on the premise that “[t]he
fingerprint is merely a digital code, which relays the unprotectable factual
information that certain pre-defined content is present in the work.”76
Without pretrial discovery, it is difficult to properly ascertain and examine
the exact details of the fingerprinting process, but the nature of the use of
the fingerprint seems to belie Turnitin’s argument. If the fingerprint is to
have any value as a plagiarism detection tool, it must accurately represent
the author’s original construction and expression.77 Functionally, the
fingerprint seems to operate as a derivative translation of the submitted
work into a mathematical digital code.78 It is critical to remember that the
fingerprint is used both for the initial originality determination and for

73. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. IV 2004).
74. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
75. See Turnitin Legal Document, supra note 43, at 6.
76. See id.
77. Facts are not copyrightable, but the particular method of expression is copyrightable. See
infra note 132 and accompanying text. Thus, insofar as Turnitin argues that the fingerprint captures
only the factual underpinnings of the original work, the fingerprint would seem incapable of
detecting plagiarism: a plagiarism detection tool is nothing without the original author’s expression.
Insofar as Turnitin argues that the presence of a match between an original and subsequent paper
is itself an uncopyrightable fact, the argument misconstrues the reasons facts are not copyrightable.
See infra note 132 and accompanying text. Indeed, taking this latter argument to its logical
conclusion, a would-be infringer could always avoid liability by simply couching the act of copying
within a factual statement of the content of the work. For example, suppose Author A writes a book.
Under Turnitin’s argument of escaping liability by copying only “the unprotectable factual
information that certain pre-defined content is present in the work,” see supra note 76 and
accompanying text, Infringer B could presumably copy Author A’s book in its entirety and avoid
liability by simply introducing the copying with the statement: “Author A wrote the following in
his book, . . . .” The copying that would follow this simple statement would be a “fact”—after all,
Infringer B is simply stating what it is that Author A wrote in A’s book—but this copying would
also undoubtedly be copyright infringement. See infra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing
the insignificance of attribution in a copyright infringement analysis). For further explanation of
why this argument is misguided, see infra note 132 and accompanying text.
78. See Emanuella Grinberg, Student Wins Battle Against Plagiarism-Detection Requirement,
CNN.com (COURT TV), Jan. 21, 2004, available at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/01/21/
ctv.plagiarism (quoting John Barrie as saying, “The value to our company is not in the collection
of words and characters in an essay, but in the series of numbers derived from the essay once we
transform those words and characters into digital fingerprints”); see also Essayfraud.org, “Guilty
Until Proven Innocent”: Hypocritical Profiteering, Oct. 20, 2006, http://www.essayfraud.org/
turnitin_john_barrie.html#5.
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subsequent originality determinations of other works. Thus Turnitin’s
proposition—that student submission of a paper to a teacher includes an
implied license to “utilize available technologies and tools to accomplish
the grading task”79 and that “[s]uch a right necessarily encompasses the
ability to transfer the work to other media (e.g., by scanning the work),
where such transfer is required for the teacher’s personal use of a
particular grading tool”80—presents a double-edged sword. If accepted,
this argument would justify the initial use of the fingerprint but would
undermine the additional use of the fingerprint to analyze future
submissions. This latter use would not be within the implied license as
“required for the teacher’s personal use of a particular grading tool.”81
Thus, this latter use could not be justified, because a teacher could neither
utilize nor transfer to Turnitin more rights than were granted by an implied
license.82 Once in a realm beyond the scope of any implied license, the
“ability to transfer the work to other media”83 would no longer be
encompassed and would instead undercut Turnitin’s argument that the
fingerprint is not a derivative work.84
Alas, while the fingerprinting issue presents an interesting academic
issue, it will likely have little bearing on a final infringement
determination. Even if the fingerprint were not a derivative work, because
Turnitin archives an actual copy of the original work, which itself plays a
vital role in the ultimate plagiarism determination,85 Turnitin would not be
able to evade infringement absent a fair use determination. Conversely,
even if the fingerprint were a derivative work, if it were also deemed to be
a fair use, then it would be by definition non-infringing.86
3. Originality Evaluation
Turnitin’s primary justification for the originality evaluation also
invokes the concept of an implied license.87 As was the case concerning
document submission, however, the implied-license argument is
superfluous.88 The initial originality evaluation is most likely a fair use,89
and even with an implied license, the aspects that go beyond the scope of
the license are not fair uses and are infringing.90

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See Turnitin Legal Document, supra note 43, at 5.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
See Turnitin Legal Document, supra note 43, at 5.
See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 129–36 and accompanying text.
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
See Turnitin Legal Document, supra note 43, at 6–7.
See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.C.
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4. Archiving
The most legally sensitive, and thus, for purposes of this Note, relevant,
aspect of the Turnitin system is the archiving of submitted works for use
(along with digital fingerprints) in originality evaluations of subsequently
submitted works.91 Conceding that, absent consent,92 the implied-license
argument championed for other purposes “may not”93 extend to archiving,
Turnitin seemingly concedes a prima facie showing of infringement and
justifies its archiving entirely on a defense of fair use.94
C. Fair Use
Having briefly acknowledged the interplay among the various
copyright issues and the common convergence to a fair use inquiry, this
section analyzes the fair use issues. This analysis concludes that up to and
including the first originality report, Turnitin’s use of student works is,
even if not protected by an implied license, a fair use. Archiving student
works and comparing them against subsequent papers, however, is not a
fair use and results in copyright infringement.
1. Fair Use Defined
Fair use is an affirmative defense that excuses otherwise infringing
activity by examining the nature of the use in light of the goals of
copyright law.95 The fair use doctrine “‘permits [and requires] courts to
avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would
stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.’”96 This
doctrine has its roots in the common law, and the Copyright Act of 197697
codified it.98 The results of fair use claims are difficult to predict, and
although the pertinent statute provides four non-exclusive factors that

91. Turnitin concedes that the archiving presents sensitive issues and requires a different
copyright analysis than other aspects of the system. See Turnitin Legal Document, supra note 43,
at 7.
92. For discussion of the consent issue, see infra Part IV.D.1.
93. Turnitin Legal Document, supra note 43, at 5.
94. Id. at 5, 7–8.
95. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574–75, 590 (1994); supra note
65 and accompanying text.
96. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (alteration in original) (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495
U.S. 207, 236 (1990)).
97. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C.A. §§ 101–1332 (West 2007)).
98. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). The codification of fair use was meant as an articulation of the
common-law doctrine, and it was not intended to alter the common law. See Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985).
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courts should consider, a fair use analysis often hinges on very specific
facts woven into a fairness argument.99 Fair use analyses evade
simplification to bright line rules, and the four statutory factors should not
be considered in isolation.100 Rather, “[a]ll are to be explored, and the
results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”101 “The
ultimate test of fair use . . . is whether the copyright law’s goal of
‘promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts’”102 “‘would be better
served by allowing the use [in question or] by preventing it.’”103 Because
fair use is an affirmative defense, the would-be infringer bears the burden
of proof.104
2. The Statutory Factors
The Copyright Act directs courts to consider four non-exclusive
statutory factors in a fair use analysis:105 “the purpose and characters of the
use,” “the nature of the copyrighted work,” “the amount and
substantiality” of the portion used relative to the whole copyrighted work,
and the use’s effect on “the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.”106 These factors are examined and applied to Turnitin’s
use below.
The first of the four non-exclusive statutory factors that the Copyright
Act directs courts to consider in a fair use analysis is “the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature
or is for nonprofit educational purposes.”107 While Turnitin certainly
serves the educational purpose of detecting—and thus hopefully
deterring—plagiarism, Turnitin also admits that “the system is provided
to institutions on a for-profit basis, and is therefore commercial in
nature.”108 Thus, because Turnitin serves both commercial and educational
functions, it is necessary to analyze carefully which portions of the system
promote which function. It is not difficult to focus on the educational

99. See Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1105, 1106–07 (1990) (“Judges do not share a consensus on the meaning of fair use. Earlier
decisions provide little basis for predicting later ones. Reversals and divided courts are
commonplace. . . . Decisions are not governed by consistent principles, but seem rather to result
from intuitive reactions to individual fact patterns.” (footnotes omitted)).
100. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577–78.
101. Id. at 578.
102. Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 1998) (alteration
in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
103. Id. (quoting Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1077 (2d Cir. 1992)).
104. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.
105. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
106. Id.
107. Id. § 107(1).
108. See Turnitin Legal Document, supra note 43, at 7.
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function of the initial originality evaluation, which is directly tied to the
educational purpose. But the subsequent step of archiving papers for future
evaluations has a more attenuated relationship to the educational function
and seems to serve primarily commercial purposes.109 Consider that
Turnitin is not the only plagiarism detection service on the market110 and
that using computer algorithms to detect plagiarism is hardly a novel
concept.111 What separates Turnitin from its competitors is its massive
student-works database. Turnitin does not shy away from this fact—to the
contrary, the company heavily markets its database, advertising that
“Turnitin is the only technology that searches against comprehensive
databases” of Internet websites, published works, and other student
papers.112 The company even boasts that “[s]earch engines do not have
access to . . . student papers, so no amount of Googling will help in these
cases.”113 Turnitin is a multi-million dollar enterprise,114 and the only
novelty it brings to the marketplace—its massive database comprised
largely of student works—is simply a combination, in its entirety and
without compensation, of previous works. This sort of piggybacking
hardly fosters the creative advancement notion underlying copyright law.
Because archiving serves primarily commercial goals, it cannot be
justified simply because the eventual uses to which archived papers will
be put (future originality evaluations) are educational.115

109. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) (noting
that the defendant’s argument that its purpose for copying was “not purely commercial” did not
sway the first factor toward fair use and “misse[d] the point entirely. The crux of the
profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether
the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary
price.”).
110. See Univ. of Md. Univ. Coll., Center for Intellectual Property, Plagiarism, Detection
Services, http://www.umuc.edu/distance/odell/cip/links_plagiarism.shtml#detection (last visited
Nov. 15, 2007) (providing links to other plagiarism detection services).
111. See supra note 33. Rather than rely on outside services, one University of Virginia professor
developed his own computerized program to scan student papers and identify matched phrases of six
or more words. See Amy Argetsinger, Technology Exposes Cheating at U-Va.; Physics Professor’s
Computer Search Triggers Investigation of 122 Students, WASH. POST, May 9, 2001, at A1. The purely
educational function of such a program presumably shifts the fair use analysis toward noninfringement. This raises the question whether databases of student works developed, maintained, and
run entirely by schools or teachers, without commercial implications, would be an economically
feasible solution to many of the copyright problems addressed in this Note.
112. See Turnitin, The Broadest Search, supra note 46. Arguably, Turnitin’s chief selling
point, more than its plagiarism detection software, is its databases.
113. Id.
114. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
115. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1383, 1386 (6th
Cir. 1996). In Princeton, the Sixth Circuit rejected a claim of fair use by a commercial copyshop
that sold to students “coursepacks” consisting of substantial portions of copyrighted works
reproduced without permission from or compensation to the copyright holder. Id. at 1383. The court
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Although archiving serves a commercial purpose, that does not
necessarily mean that it cannot be a fair use.116 The key inquiry may be
whether the use is transformative. Transformative works do more than
merely supplant the original works; rather, transformative works “add[]
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the
first with new expression, meaning, or message.”117 Because they add
something new, transformative works further the primary goal of copyright
law by promoting science and the arts. Thus transformative works “lie at
the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the
confines of copyright,” and the more transformative a new work, the less
significant other factors that weigh against fair use, such as
commercialism, become.118 While courts have not uniformly defined or
characterized transformative works,119 the most helpful framework may be
that urged by a leading copyright treatise120 and adopted by the Seventh
Circuit. This framework merges the transformative analysis with a
functional analysis and determines, in economic terms, whether a second
use is complementary or substitutional.121
The second of the four non-exclusive statutory factors looks to “the
nature of the copyrighted work.”122 When applying this factor, a court is
guided by how closely the copied work meshes with the goals of copyright
protection; the closer an original work aligns with the core goals of
copyright protection, the more difficult establishing fair use becomes.123
While this factor might make it easier to show fair use of works authored
by students, who have other incentives to create and arguably do not need
the incentives of copyright protection,124 this factor generally weighs

noted that even though students ultimately put the coursepacks to use in their classes and toward
educational purposes, the challenged use by the copyshop, “the duplication of copyrighted materials
for sale by a for-profit corporation that has decided to maximize its profits—and give itself a
competitive edge over other copyshops—by declining to pay the royalties requested by the holders
of the copyrights,” was commercial in nature. Id. at 1386.
116. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584–85 (1994) (“[T]he
commercial or nonprofit educational character of a work is ‘not conclusive,’ but rather a fact to be
‘weighed along with other[s] in fair use decisions.’” (alterations in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448–49 (1984))).
117. Id. at 579.
118. Id. at 578–79.
119. See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 66, § 13.05[A][1][b] (discussing varying and
inconsistent interpretations of transformative works).
120. See id.
121. See Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, 292 F.3d 512, 517–18 (7th Cir. 2002). This framework is
discussed more thoroughly below in the context of the fourth statutory factor—the effect on the
value of or market for the copyrighted work. See infra notes 137–56 and accompanying text.
122. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2000).
123. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
124. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
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against Turnitin because the works in question are most likely unpublished
and because “‘[t]he scope of the fair use doctrine is considerably narrower
with respect to unpublished works.’”125 Nonetheless, the rationale for
giving greater protection to unpublished works—protecting first
publication rights126—is arguably unharmed by Turnitin’s use, which does
not disseminate works to the public but uses them internally for plagiarism
detection.127 Still, because Turnitin’s effectiveness as a plagiarism
detection tool often necessitates disseminating matching texts to teachers
for comparison purposes, the use is not entirely internal and thus may
offend the first publication rights.128
The third factor considers “the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”129 Although Turnitin
claims that no portions of archived student works, other than direct textual
matches in subsequently submitted works, are “displayed, used, published,
distributed or further copied without prior author consent,”130 its policies
and user guide suggest otherwise. Recall that Turnitin places the burden
of the final plagiarism determination on the teacher and that the system is
not designed to make this determination.131 To have any value to teachers,
the system must provide a way to check potentially plagiarized materials
against the originals. It is difficult to surmise how this check against
originals can have any veracity if it simply shows matching textual runs
without referencing any other text or the context of the complete
original.132 This is verified by the Turnitin user guide, which provides a
mechanism for viewing original papers.133 Thus, because Turnitin uses the
125. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 597 (1985) (quoting
4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 66, § 13.05[A][2][b]).
126. See id. at 551–53, 564.
127. See Turnitin, Plagiarism Prevention, supra note 44.
128. See infra notes 130–33 and accompanying text.
129. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2000).
130. See Turnitin Legal Document, supra note 43, at 8. At a minimum, however, Turnitin
itself archives and maintains entire works. See id.
131. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
132. Turnitin validates the limited textual matches that it admits to disclosing by arguing that
the presence of a textual match is an unprotected fact and that where there is no other way to
disclose a fact other than by copying the original, the fact and the material representing it “merge”
and neither is protected by copyright. See Turnitin Legal Document, supra note 43, at 8. This is an
odd argument because the reason that facts do not receive copyright protection is that the author
does not create facts, and only the original expression, which was created by the author, merits
protection. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–50 (1991). As the
Supreme Court noted, facts are not protected, “because facts do not owe their origin to an act of
authorship.” Id. at 347. In the instant scenario, however, the “fact” of a textual match lies in the
particular expression by the original author. This is not the type of fact intended to be precluded
from copyright protection: Were there no original author, there would be no fact, and thus the fact
of a textual match owes its origin directly “to an act of authorship.” See id.
133. See TURNITIN, INSTRUCTOR USER GUIDE 20 (2006), available at http://turnitin.com/static/
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entire work, this third factor appears to weigh heavily against fair use.134
In appropriate circumstances, however, even copying an entire work can
be consistent with fair use.135 Turnitin’s argument that its entire copying
should not weigh against fair use may very well parallel its functional
argument, described below, because showing a different functional use can
lessen the effect of entire copying.136
The fourth statutory factor looks to “the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”137 This factor asks
courts “to consider not only the extent of market harm caused by the
particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also ‘whether unrestricted
and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would
result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market’ for the
original.”138 This factor requires a court to undertake the functional
analysis (merged with the transformative analysis) above139 and to examine

pdf/tii_instructor_guide.pdf. Rather than requiring original-author approval, however, this
mechanism instead requires approval of the submitting instructor. Id. Turnitin’s Instructor User
Guide provides:
Because of our strict privacy policy, sources in the Turnitin database are
handled differently from internet sources. If a source is from our database, student
papers will show up next to the source.
If the source of matching text is a student paper that belongs to one of your
classes, the paper will be displayed with the matching text highlighted.
If the paper is from another instructor’s class, we cannot provide direct access
to the paper. To view the paper, you must first request permission from the
instructor in possession of the paper by clicking the permission request button. We
will then auto-generate an e-mail detailing your request. If permission to view the
paper is granted, a copy of the paper will be sent back to you via e-mail.
Id. In addition to being inappropriate and contrary to Turnitin’s assertions, the procedure of relying
on prior instructor approval raises the question whether teachers who authorize release of a student
paper could themselves face liability for authorizing the reproduction of a copyrighted work. See
17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (Supp. IV 2004). For a discussion of a response certain schools have taken to
this procedure, see infra note 208.
134. Ordinarily, copying does “‘not constitute a fair use if the entire work is reproduced.’”
Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting 4 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 66, § 13.05[A][3]).
135. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449–50 (1984)
(holding the use of home videotape recorders for timeshifting to be a fair use and noting that
because “timeshifting merely enables a viewer to see such a work which he had been invited to
witness in its entirety free of charge,” a copying of the entire work “does not have its ordinary
effect of militating against a finding of fair use”).
136. See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 66, § 13.05[D][1].
137. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000).
138. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (omission in original)
(quoting 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 66, § 13.05[A][4]).
139. See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text.
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three potential harms to the value of or market for the original student
works.
The first, and perhaps most cynical, market harm is stopping potential
sales by students to other students or to term-paper mills for the express
purpose of cheating or recycling content.140 Obviously, a paper in the
Turnitin database has a drastically deflated value in such a market because
no one would buy a paper to recycle its content if that person knew that the
paper was in the Turnitin database and thus knew that detection was far
more likely. However, admitting the existence of this potential market
raises two issues. First, in light of the public interest in limiting such a
market and the questionable legality of such a market—selling papers for
the purpose of copying is illegal in some states141—it remains to be seen
whether courts would even acknowledge such a potential market. Before
casually dismissing this market, however, consider the case of Mitchell
Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater.142 Declining to impose content
restrictions on copyrightability, the Fifth Circuit in Mitchell held that
obscenity did not preclude copyright protection.143 This raises a question:
If obscenity, and arguably by extension works with illegal content,144 does
not preclude copyright protection, can the illegality of a potential market
preclude recognizing it in a fair use analysis? The answer may be no. As
the Mitchell opinion noted, “Because the private suit of the plaintiff in a
copyright infringement action furthers the congressional goal of promoting
creativity, the courts should not concern themselves with the moral worth
of the plaintiff.”145 The first issue would warrant more discussion were it

140. See Jared Slade, A Fair Response to Students’ Intellectual Property Rights, IBLAWG
P RESENTED BY : DUKE L. & TECH. REV ., Oct. 18, 2006, http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/
iblawg/?p=41 (noting this potential market but arguing that Turnitin should be protected by fair
use).
141. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66400 (West 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 23-4-103 (2007);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-392(b) (2007); FLA. STAT. § 877.17 (2007); 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1
(2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 705 (2007); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 26-201 (West
2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 271, § 50 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.320 (2005); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 18A:2-3 (West 2007); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 213-b (McKinney 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14118.2 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 165.114 (2005); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7324 (2007); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 32.50 (Vernon 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-505 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 28B.10.584 (2006).
142. 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979).
143. Id. at 854. Although the Fifth Circuit in Mitchell was interpreting a prior version of the
Copyright Act, the Ninth Circuit followed Mitchell in a case interpreting the current Copyright Act.
See Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1982). Mitchell is also cited by a leading
copyright treatise as stating the prevailing law. See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 66,
§ 2.17. Nonetheless, one court expressed skepticism about the Mitchell decision. See Devils Films,
Inc. v. Nectar Video, 29 F. Supp. 2d 174, 175–76 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
144. See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 66, § 2.17.
145. Mitchell, 604 F.2d at 862.
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not for the decisive second issue raised by this potential market. The
second issue is functional: The type of harm caused to this market is not
the type of harm copyright law seeks to prevent. This market is not harmed
by the use of papers in a plagiarism detection database replacing or
substituting for papers sold to cheat; rather, like a scathing review, which
also undeniably harms the work or product it concerns, the harm to the
original flows from a complementary use.146
The second potential market harmed is that of student licensing to
Turnitin itself for the exact purpose for which Turnitin currently uses
student papers. This circular reasoning makes for tricky analysis. Courts
cannot automatically follow such logic, or else the fourth statutory factor
would always favor the plaintiffs.147 Instead, courts should look to whether
such licensing falls within “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be
developed markets.”148 There is no traditional market for licensing papers
to plagiarism detection services, but the cut-and-paste plagiarism problem
is also a relatively new phenomenon.149 As for reasonable or likely to be
developed markets, it is difficult to determine whether such a market could
or would exist. The fourth statutory factor contemplates widespread

146. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591–92 (1994) (noting that courts
must distinguish between legitimate use, such as a scathing review, which merely suppresses
demand, and copyright infringement, which usurps demand).
147. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 n.17 (2d Cir. 1994).
148. Id. at 930. In American Geophysical Union, the Second Circuit noted, “It is indisputable
that, as a general matter, a copyright holder is entitled to demand a royalty for licensing others to
use its copyrighted work, and that the impact on potential licensing revenues is a proper subject for
consideration in assessing the fourth factor.” Id. at 929 (citation omitted). The question arose
whether licensing individual articles within a scientific journal was for “traditional, reasonable, or
likely to be developed markets.” Id. at 914, 930. The Second Circuit found that, although the
plaintiff journal publishers, who were assigned copyrights in the individual articles, failed to
establish a “conventional market for the direct sale and distribution of individual articles,” the
fourth statutory factor nonetheless weighed against fair use because, through a clearinghouse, they
created “a workable market for institutional users to obtain licenses for the right to produce their
own copies of individual articles via photocopying.” Id. at 930. This holding came despite
recognitions by the Second Circuit that “writers of journal articles do not directly seek to capture
the potential financial rewards that stem from their copyrights by personally marketing copies of
their writings” and that “though there is a traditional market for, and hence a clearly defined value
of, journal issues and volumes, . . . there is neither a traditional market for, nor a clearly defined
value of, individual journal articles.” Id. at 927. While the court noted the narrowness of its
holding—“We do not decide how the fair use balance would be resolved if a photocopying license
for [individual] articles were not currently available”—it also noted that “[t]he vice of circular
reasoning arises only if the availability of payment is conclusive against fair use.” Id. at 931. Thus,
although student authors do not necessarily expect to market their papers for use as plagiarism
detection aids, nor do they necessarily expect to profit from such a use when they create the papers,
this lack of expectations should not preclude finding against fair use if such a market is reasonable
or likely to develop.
149. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
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existence of the defendant’s conduct,150 but in the instant analysis, no
artificial exaggeration is necessary: Turnitin’s use is so widespread that,
relative to its competitors, it already has a significant advantage, if not a
stranglehold, on the student-paper market.151
The same problem applies to the closely related third potential
market—licensing to Turnitin’s plagiarism detection competitors. While
no individual student could create this market, it is possible that in the
aggregate, enough student papers could be licensed to create such a
market, at least if all companies were starting with a blank slate. But with
Turnitin’s millions-plus paper head start in its ever-growing database, the
entry barrier is simply too high for a competitor to offer licensing fees for
the papers that Turnitin appropriates for free. As John Barrie stated, “We’ll
become the next generation’s spell checker. . . . There will be no room for
anybody else, not even a Microsoft, to provide a similar type of service
because we will have the database.”152 In sum, the lack of licensing of
papers for use in plagiarism detection may be more a product of Turnitin’s
longstanding conduct than of the infeasibility of such a market.

150. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
151. See infra note 152; supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text.
152. Kate Masur, Papers, Profits, and Pedagogy: Plagiarism in the Age of the Internet,
P ERSP ., May 2001 (omission in original), available at http://www.historians.org/perspectives/
issues/2001/0105/0105new3.cfm. If nothing else, one must certainly question the logic of
provoking Microsoft by pointing out the competitive advantages gained by techniques that are at
the very least of questionable copyright legality. Considering Microsoft’s recent blistering attack
on Google’s copyright policies, it would appear that waking the sleeping Microsoft giant would not
be Turnitin’s most cost-effective legal strategy. See Microsoft Attacks Google on Copyright, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2007, at C5. Indeed, one complaint by Microsoft’s counsel, “‘[c]ompanies that
create no content of their own, and make money solely on the backs of other people’s content, are
raking in billions,’” id. (quoting Thomas Rubin, associate general counsel of Microsoft), seems just
as pertinent to Turnitin as it does to Google. In fact, in light of parallels between Turnitin and
certain Google practices—Google currently faces litigation related to its attempt to make books
searchable online by adding to its database digital copies of copyrighted books from libraries—the
Turnitin analysis may ultimately be at least partially affected by how the Google litigation shapes
copyright law. See id.; see also John Gapper, Microsoft to Attack Google’s ‘Cavalier’ Attitude, FIN.
TIMES (London), Mar. 6, 2007, at 1. For a more detailed analysis of Google’s book-search issues,
see Hannibal Travis, Google Book Search and Fair Use: iTunes for Authors, or Napster for Books?,
61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 87, 123–51 (2006) (arguing that Google’s actions should be considered a fair
use). As with Turnitin, Google presents a challenge because its overall purpose is praiseworthy, but
its mechanisms and policies raise questions. Thus the comment by one lawyer involved in a suit
against Google—“One of the challenges is ‘This is Google. What would the world be without
Google?’ We don’t want the world without Google. We want the world without Google infringing
our copyrights”—is also applicable to Turnitin: We don’t want a world without plagiarism
detection services, we simply want a world where those services don’t infringe copyrights. See
Declan McCullagh, Copyright Tussles for Google, CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 4, 2006,
http://news.com.com/2100-1025_3-6102153.html.
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The final issue, which has already been addressed briefly, is that of
function:
Suppose A is the copyright owner of a published novel. B
produces a motion picture copied from and substantially
similar to A’s novel. . . . B’s motion picture has not prejudiced
the sale of A’s work in the book medium, but it has certainly
prejudiced the sale of A’s work in the motion picture medium.
If the defendant’s work adversely affects the value of any of
the rights in the copyrighted work (in this case the adaptation
right), the use is not fair, even if the rights thus affected have
not as yet been exercised by the plaintiff.
But, if regardless of medium, the defendant’s work,
although containing substantially similar material, performs
a different function than that of the plaintiff’s, the defense of
fair use may be invoked.153
In this regard, Turnitin argues that because the paper is not being used
for its original purpose, as a class assignment or expression of ideas, but
is being used for a new purpose of plagiarism detection, the use should be
considered fair.154 Although this is certainly valid to some extent, there are
also shortcomings with this argument. Turnitin’s work is no “work” at all.
An exact copy of an existing work, Turnitin’s “new work” gives no
creative benefit to the public. Also, unlike other contexts, there is no
additional factor to militate against viewing this function as a not-yetexercised right.155 Thus, the test reverts to the analysis above, and a court
must determine whether the licensing of papers for plagiarism detection
is either a primary or derivative market156 of the papers themselves.
In a final reconciliation of the statutory factors, the brief use of the
student works in the initial stages of document submission and originality
evaluation both primarily serve educational purposes. At the archiving
stage, however, it is hard to escape the fact that Turnitin is copying

153. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 66, § 13.05[B][1] (footnotes omitted).
154. See Memorandum from Paul Wedlake, Dir. of Sales, iParadigms, LLC/Turnitin.com, to
Duke Info. Tech. Advisory Council, http://www.oit.duke.edu/itac/minutes/2001/11101minutes.html
(last visited Nov. 15, 2007) [hereinafter Turnitin Legal Memo]. The same memorandum, which
contains Turnitin’s standard response to copyright inquiries, is also available elsewhere. See E-mail
from Paul Wedlake, Dir. of Sales, iParadigms, LLC/Turnitin.com, to inquirer (Oct. 25, 2001),
http://www.bedfordstmartins.com/technotes/workshops/fullcopyright.htm.
155. For example, because an author is unlikely to create a parody of the author’s own work,
the market for parody of an original work is not considered a potential licensing market of the
original work. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994).
156. “The market for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original
works would in general develop or license others to develop.” Id.
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unpublished works in their entirety and is using those copies, without
compensation, to derive a significant and profitable commercial benefit.
If there is a justification for finding Turnitin’s archiving use to be a fair
use, it does not seem to lie in the statutory factors. Rather, the justification
must lie in some embedded feature of plagiarism detection that evades
articulation within the statutory framework but nonetheless comports with
the goals of copyright law and warrants deferential fair use treatment.
3. Plagiarism vs. Copyright Infringement: Does Plagiarism
Prevention Merit Special Treatment in a Fair Use Analysis?
There is considerable overlap between plagiarism and copyright
infringement. But, both to fully develop the fair use arguments in this Note
and to understand the broader implications that the ultimate resolution of
these issues could have on the future of copyright law, it is necessary to
compare and distinguish the two concepts. Plagiarism is a breach of ethics
and morality, while copyright infringement is a legal violation.157 While
unattributed copying of a copyrighted work can be both plagiarism and
copyright infringement, it is also entirely possible to run afoul of either
doctrine without offending the other.158 For example, someone who copies
an entire book but carefully attributes this copying and properly notates
direct quotations would not be a plagiarist but might be a copyright
infringer.159 On the other hand, someone who borrows without attribution
only a small fraction of another’s work might evade a copyright
infringement suit by claiming fair use but would still be a plagiarist.160
157. See Kindergartners Count, Inc. v. Demoulin, 249 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1251–52 (D. Kan.
2003). Quoting a law dictionary, the Kindergartners court noted:
Plagiarism, which many people commonly think has to do with copyright, is
not in fact a legal doctrine. True plagiarism is an ethical, not a legal offense and
is enforceable by academic authorities, not courts. Plagiarism occurs when
someone—a hurried student, a neglectful professor, an unscrupulous
writer—falsely claims someone else’s words, whether copyrighted or not, as his
own. Of course, if the plagiarized work is protected by copyright, the unauthorized
reproduction is also a copyright infringement.
Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1170 (7th ed. 1999)); see also POSNER, supra note 6, at
38, 48 (noting that plagiarism is an ethical violation that is better left to “informal, private
sanctions” and that “[p]lagiarism that infringes copyright adds a clear legal violation to an ethical
violation and by invading a property right does more harm to the author of the copied work”).
158. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 12. Even when the two concepts overlap, they remain
“different wrongs in the sense of injuring different interests of the victims.” Id. at 46.
159. See id. at 17.
160. See Lisa Maruca, Plagiarism and Copyright: Connections in the Turnitin Culture,
S WEETLAND W RITING C ENTER N EWSL., Winter 2006, at 8, 8, available at
http://141.211.177.75/UofM/Content/SWC/document/SWC_W06.pdf. On this point, however,
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Additionally, it is possible to plagiarize something that does not receive
copyright protection. For example, a person who, without attribution,
copies extensively from a work that is in the public domain may be a
plagiarist but would not be a copyright infringer.161 Thus, plagiarism and
copyright infringement are not legal equivalents—finding no copyright
infringement does not, as a matter of law, mean that no plagiarism
occurred.162 In contrast to plagiarism, copyright applies to expression, not
ideas.163 Judge Posner contends that, at least relative to commercial
writing, plagiarism is more akin to a trademark infringement—“passing
off one’s inferior brand as a well-known superior brand”—than a
copyright infringement.164 Perhaps the most helpful way to differentiate
between the concepts is to view plagiarism as a defect in process and
copyright infringement as a defect in result.165
Judge Posner disagrees, noting that “[t]he plagiarist does not play fair” and arguing that there can
be no fair use “when the copier is passing off the copied passage as his own.” See POSNER, supra
note 6, at 16–17. Judge Posner’s argument is well taken, and the conduct of the person claiming
fair use is certainly a relevant factor. See Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1175–76, 1176 n.8 (9th
Cir. 1983) (finding against fair use where the defendant copied nearly verbatim with no attempt to
attribute). But, like most fair use factors, conduct alone is not dispositive. See Time Inc. v. Bernard
Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding a fair use despite recognizing the
defendant’s misconduct). Whatever the ultimate resolution of the issue, Judge Posner acknowledges
that it is possible to plagiarize without running afoul of copyright laws. See infra note 161 and
accompanying text.
161. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 46–47, 73. The “creative commons” created by the public
domain should not be discounted; it is an invaluable tool and “a resource that creators throughout
history have drawn upon freely.” Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford Law Sch., Dunwody
Distinguished Lecture in Law: The Creative Commons (Apr. 26, 2002), in 55 FLA. L. REV. 763, 764
(2003).
162. Kindergartners, 249 F. Supp. at 1252. Conversely (and more pertinent to the instant
analysis), a finding of plagiarism does not mean, as a matter of law, that a copyright infringement
has occurred. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
163. See Kindergartners, 249 F. Supp. at 1251.
164. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 69. “Trademark infringement in the market for ordinary
goods corresponds to plagiarism in the market for expressive goods. Trademarks and author
‘branding’ (by naming) coevolved as ways of protecting sellers and consumers as markets
expanded and became impersonal.” Id. The analogy still holds true in the academic context, where
passing off another’s work as one’s own still unfairly enhances one “brand,” only in this scenario
the deception is of the teacher not the consumer, and the competition is for grades not market share.
See id. at 69, 106–07. That said, Judge Posner is more critical of student plagiarism, which he views
as the only type of plagiarism that potentially presents “a social problem grave enough to warrant
draconian solutions.” Id. at 38. To that end, Judge Posner, albeit without discussion of the copyright
issues examined in this Note, supports the use of Turnitin as a plagiarism detection tool, calling
schools that do not use it naïve. See id. at 82. Regardless whether Turnitin is the proper solution,
it is, even if not naïve, certainly disingenuous for a school simply to rest on its honor code, which
is less effective if not accompanied by some proactive procedures. See Moohr, supra note 22, at
975.
165. See Stearns, supra note 25, at 9. “Copyright law’s indifference to the issue of attribution,
despite attribution’s central place in the definition of plagiarism, demonstrates . . . the law’s focus
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With this distinction in mind, it is necessary to revisit the plagiarism
problem. As presented in Part II, the plagiarism problem focused only on
the perspective of the academic world. In some other regards, however,
plagiarism can benefit society. Some of the greatest and most recognized
literary works of all time would be considered plagiarism if judged by
today’s standards.166
Remember that plagiarism is a defect in process, not result,167 and the
reality is that plagiarism may often lead to a remarkable result,
significantly improving the original work along the way.168 Although this

on result, not process. . . . [P]lagiarists shortchange both themselves and the original authors.
In . . . copyright law, the only harm that counts is the resulting harm to the infringed work . . . .”
Id. at 11; accord POSNER, supra note 6, at 91–92.
166. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 51 (“[W]as not Shakespeare a plagiarist by modern
standards? Thousands of lines in his plays are verbatim copies or close paraphrases from various
sources, along with titles and plot details, all without acknowledgement.”). Writers such as Homer,
Plato, Socrates, and Aristotle all borrowed heavily from previous works, sometimes in the form of
whole pages without attribution. See Hansen, supra note 15, at 782. Of course, this could also be
a critique of copyright law because today it too would likely label these writers infringers, but at
least copyright law provides corresponding creative benefits. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 73. After
discussing one such example in Shakespeare’s work, Judge Posner comments, “If this is plagiarism,
we need more plagiarism. The standard reason given for why it is not plagiarism is that in
Shakespeare’s time, unlike ours, creativity was understood to be improvement rather than
originality.” Id. at 53–54. Still, many other classic works, some in literature and some not, involve
copying but should not be considered plagiarism. See id. at 54–55. For example, when Bob Dylan
was discovered to have possibly lifted certain song lyrics without attribution, rather than being
viewed as just “one more plagiarist,” Dylan was lauded for “doing what he has always done:
writing songs that are information collages.” Jon Pareles, Critic’s Notebook; Plagiarism in Dylan,
Or a Cultural Collage?, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2003, at B7. After all, “[i]deas aren’t meant to be
carved in stone and left inviolate; they’re meant to stimulate the next idea and the next.” Id. In fact,
not only did the Dylan revelation boost sales of the book from which the verses were purportedly
lifted, but its author was also “ecstatic to have inspired such a well-known songwriter.” Id. For a
discussion of many other such works in various contexts, all involving some degree of copying but
none involving plagiarism, see POSNER, supra note 6, at 54–61. As explained, for example, in a
self-deprecating episode of The Simpsons: “Animation is built on plagiarism. If it weren’t for
someone plagiarizing The Honeymooners, we wouldn’t have The Flintstones. If someone hadn’t
ripped off Sergeant Bilko, there’d be no Top Cat. Huckleberry Hound, Chief Wiggum, Yogi Bear?
Ha! Andy Griffith, Edward G. Robinson, Art Carney.” The Simpsons: The Day the Violence Died
(Fox television broadcast Mar. 17, 1996). Ultimately, the problem may be that the modern meaning
of plagiarism is improperly influenced by the “absurd idea that ‘copying’ is inherently bad.” See
POSNER, supra note 6, at 74.
167. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
168. “To the extent that an imitator or copier produces something better than the
original . . . or interestingly different from it . . . , the imitation is producing value.” POSNER, supra
note 6, at 60. Furthermore, if “the person whose work is copied is long dead and the work out of
copyright, the copying does not harm him.” Id. at 61; see also id. at 70 (discussing plagiarism
accompanied by “changes that improved on” the original such that it “might have been deemed
creative imitation” in the seventeenth century but nonetheless “is unequivocally plagiarism today”).
Not to overstate the point, Judge Posner also recognizes that “[c]reative imitation cannot have as
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Note accepts that in a Machiavellian sense plagiarism that improves the
original work ought to be encouraged, from an ethical standpoint this Note
does not condone plagiarism. The point is simply that plagiarism can be
cured by fastidious attribution and proper quotation, neither of which
concerns the quality or content of the plagiarizing work.
With a grasp of the differences both in objectives and enforcement of
plagiarism and copyright, it is now possible to examine the most intriguing
fair use argument offered by Turnitin—an argument that could alter the
parameters of fair use and have implications that reach beyond the Turnitin
litigation. Consider this argument taken from Turnitin’s standard response
to legal inquiries:
We believe that use of the student’s paper would be
deemed fair because rather than constituting infringement, the
use prevents infringement of that paper from occurring. The
student’s paper is only being used to catch someone who
might have stolen from it. That’s the primary purpose of the
use and so it would likely be accorded even more deference
than other recognized purposes of fair use such as education,
commentary and research because its promotion of the
underlying goal of the copyright statute, i.e., to promote
creativity, is higher.169
There are several problems with this argument. First, it commingles
copyright infringement with plagiarism. Turnitin is not a copyright
infringement detection tool; it is a plagiarism detection tool. Second, the
purpose of Turnitin is to detect any plagiarism in submitted works,170 not
to protect archived works from being plagiarized—iParadigms has a

capacious a scope or as positive a connotation in a modern commercial society of commodified
intellectual works as it did in Shakespeare’s time.” Id. at 71. Yet even this plea to economics seems
more appropriately tailored to copyright, or at least to the overlapping area of the two concepts,
than to plagiarism unaccompanied by copyright infringement. Because changing attitudes toward
plagiarism trace their roots to the advent of the printing press and the correlative viewing of writing
as a craft and works as intellectual property, the distinction between plagiarism that also infringes
a copyright and plagiarism that infringes no copyright remains relevant. See Hansen, supra note
15, at 783–86. While student plagiarism arguably poses problems more serious than other forms
of plagiarism, see supra note 164, it would be shortsighted to suggest that student plagiarism is so
drastically different that it cannot likewise improve prior works in the process. Indeed, Turnitin’s
own data suggest that less than one percent of students plagiarize by turning in papers entirely
copied from another source; rather, the vast majority of student plagiarism draws from multiple
sources. See Turnitin, The Broadest Search, supra note 46.
169. Turnitin Legal Memo, supra note 154. The company’s Complaint for Declaratory Relief
offered substantially the same argument, albeit slightly less articulately. See Complaint for
Declaratory Relief, supra note 14, at 4–5.
170. See Turnitin, Plagiarism Prevention, supra note 44.
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separate business for that type of protective service, iThenticate.171
Consider what happens—or more importantly what does not
happen—when Turnitin finds a match: The match is highlighted in an
originality report, which is sent to the instructor, but at no point is the
original author contacted and warned about potential infringement.172
Perhaps the second author does not get a failing grade and is allowed to
resubmit a revised paper. This revised paper can fix any plagiarism—but
not copyright—issues with more careful attribution,173 yet the copyright
owner of the original work is never notified. Thus, while there may be
some secondary benefits of deterring plagiarism, and in turn protecting
student copyrights, it is a misnomer to state that the primary purpose of
Turnitin is student-author copyright protection. But even more problematic
(and important) than this faulty logic is the faulty premise that underlies
it—by protecting copyrights from infringement, plagiarism prevention
necessarily promotes the goals of copyright law.
Even assuming arguendo that Turnitin is correct when it asserts that it
serves primarily as a mechanism to prevent copyright infringement, the
argument still raises significant questions. Notwithstanding the statutory
factors previously examined—and recognizing that those statutory factors
are not exclusive—does plagiarism detection, if it serves primarily to
“protect” copyrights from infringement, promote the goals of copyright
law such that it warrants a special expansion of the notion of fair use? In
other words, should plagiarism detection and prevention therefore “be
accorded even more deference than other recognized purposes of fair use
such as education, commentary and research”?174 Turnitin’s premise
answers these questions affirmatively and essentially seeks
acknowledgment of a special expansion of fair use to protect plagiarism
prevention.175 As discussed below, however, for three distinct reasons, the
appropriate answer to these questions is no. Plagiarism prevention should
not receive expanded recognition as a fair use, because it (1) enforces
rights contrary to the wishes of the copyright owner,176 (2) restricts
subsequent use by second authors even of limited recycled material, which
might nonetheless be acceptable for copyright purposes,177 and (3)
encourages self-censorship by original authors.178
First, although copyright law grants a monopoly to the author of an
original work, it does so with reluctance: It is only for consideration of,

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.B.
See POSNER, supra note 6, at 17, 91–92.
Turnitin Legal Memo, supra note 154.
See id.
See infra notes 179–93 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 194–96 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 197–99 and accompanying text.
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and as incitement for, the creation of original works (which benefit the
public) that the law is willing to grant this monopoly.179 Even then, the
reluctance with which the monopoly is granted mandates that it be granted
only for a limited period.180 Ideally the law would not need to offer
incentives to create, but in that vein ideality is synonymous with naïvety.
Nonetheless, the best scenario from the copyright perspective would be for
any original author immediately to renounce all copyright exclusivities and
to donate all potential uses to the public domain. From the perspective of
copyright law, enforcing the exclusive rights of the author is not a lofty
ideal but merely a tolerated price of the bargain.181 The law does not
champion these exclusive rights;182 instead, it trades them in return for
creativity.183 In essence, the public pays its end of the bargain every time
an author enforces a copyright. Yet Turnitin purports to enforce the rights
of another, the student, who is not a willing party in the enforcement. This
argument offers fair use, contrary to the wishes of the author, as a method
of increasing the strength of a copyright to the detriment of the creation of
additional works.184 At this point, the creative work has already been
179. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
180. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing that Congress shall promote copyright
objectives “by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 429 (1984) (“The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor
primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by
which an important public purpose may be achieved.”).
181. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“The copyright
law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.”).
182. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of the United
States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors.”).
183. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rationalizing the Allocative/Distributive Relationship in
Copyright, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 853, 855 (2004) (“The end is to benefit the public. The means is
to permit creative people to internalize the benefits of their efforts by limiting free riding.”).
184. The net result of this fair use concept may well be to prevent the creation of new works
that copyright law would be prepared to accept. Consider a scenario where student B copies,
without attribution, a small portion of student A’s work. Although this is most certainly plagiarism,
remembering the discussion in note 160 supra, assume that the copying is used in such a manner
that it might nonetheless be considered a fair use. Now assume that the student B is flagged, the
paper is tossed aside as plagiarism, and student B is expelled. In this scenario the new paper would
have been acceptable and in fact encouraged by copyright law, but due to the more stringent
standards of plagiarism, the new paper has been lost forever.
Likewise, there can be plagiarism without copyright infringement “when noncopyrightable
features of a work . . . are copied without acknowledgement, so that readers of the new work are
invited to think that those features are the invention or discovery of the plagiarist.” See POSNER,
supra note 6, at 14. Assume that student A, in response to topic X, submits a paper that quotes
historical works by Shakespeare, which are in the public domain. Student B reads student A’s paper
and, also writing in response to topic X, and without ever reading the Shakespearian work itself,
copies the same passages from Shakespeare as student A, without any attribution. Student B has
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authored. Additional incentives to create are unnecessary.185 Although the
pre-existing incentives must be enforced to honor the bargain between the
author and the law and to show future authors that the promise of
exclusivity is not an empty one, enforcing the exclusive rights serves no
purpose if it is not done by or on behalf of the copyright holder.
Furthermore, the goals of copyright law are best served if the exclusive
rights afforded to the copyright holder are ignored.186 To understand the
backward reasoning of argument on this point, consider the logic behind
allowing parody as a fair use.187 In the case of parody, the fair use
argument weakens the copyright by allowing another to use portions of the
original work for the purpose of creating a new work with new
expressions.188 Thus, while the traditional fair use application serves to

arguably plagiarized student A’s work, see id. at 15–16, and would certainly be flagged by Turnitin.
Yet the idea of applying Shakespeare to topic X, like all ideas, is not copyrightable. See id. at
12–13. The copyrightable aspect is the particular form of expressing that idea. See id. at 13. But
in the present scenario, that form consists of a quote that is already in the public domain. Although
Turnitin’s use of the entire paper could violate the other copyrightable portions of student A’s
paper, student B, by plagiarizing only the non-copyrightable quote already in the public domain,
is again guilty of plagiarism but not copyright infringement. Thus, if student B’s work is discarded
as plagiarism, the public is deprived of a work that copyright law would have accepted.
185. Consider Professor Harrison’s critique of an act that retroactively extended the duration
of copyright protection by twenty years: “In the [case of an author who has yet to create a work],
the argument can be made that the twenty-year extension increases the income the author earns for
works yet to be created and, therefore, provides an incentive to produce more,” but “[i]n the case
of the work that is already in existence, the impact is strictly distributive and whatever effort the
author makes to protect the income associated with the twenty-year windfall cannot be seen as
beneficial to the public generally.” Harrison, supra note 183, at 861–62; see also Jeffrey L.
Harrison, Dunwody Commentary, Creativity or Commons: A Comment on Professor Lessig, 55
FLA. L. REV. 795, 803–05 (2003) (arguing that a retroactive extension neither improves an author’s
incentives nor enhances the public benefits).
186. Of course, by complaining about Turnitin, the student authors are obviously not ignoring
these exclusive rights. But in this regard, they are enforcing their rights against only another who
seeks to use the exact same work as opposed to enforcing the rights against one who seeks to take
that work and, even if plagiarizing it in the process, potentially build upon it.
187. Even parody is not presumptively fair, and it too must work its way through a case-bycase analysis for a fair use determination. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
581 (1994).
188. “The ‘parody’ branch of the ‘fair use’ doctrine is itself a means of fostering the creativity
protected by the copyright law. . . . Whatever aesthetic appeal [an original work of authorship with
elements of parody] may have results from the creativity that the copyright law is designed to
promote.” Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 242–43 (2d Cir. 1983). Thus,
giving the author of the work subject to the parody “further protection against parody does little to
promote creativity, but it places a substantial inhibition upon the creativity of authors adept at using
parody to entertain, inform, or stir public consciousness.” Id. Parody thus lends itself to fair use
because of its transformative value: “Like less ostensibly humorous forms of criticism, it can
provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new
one.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
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allow more works (in turn benefiting the public) by frustrating
enforcement attempts by an overly enthusiastic original author, Turnitin’s
argument of fair use, in contrast, would disallow more works (in turn
harming the public) by encouraging enforcement by an indifferent original
author.189 Thus, while parody results in a new work, which benefits the
public and achieves the goals of copyright law by promoting “the Progress
of Science and useful Arts,”190 the benefits of Turnitin’s proffered use are
primarily internalized;191 any ancillary benefits to the public relate to
plagiarism prevention, which is impertinent to copyright concerns.192
These ancillary benefits to the public do not justify expanding fair use
either. Plagiarism may be a pressing social dilemma, and archiving student
papers for plagiarism prevention may promote a very legitimate public
benefit. But because that benefit is impertinent to the goals of copyright
law, its promotion does not justify expanding fair use.193

189. It is worth noting the oddity of Turnitin using a student’s work as it wishes and trying to
validate its actions by arguing that the use is in the student’s best interest. Perhaps the student
author is not indifferent at all. Perhaps the student has determined that the “free” protection
provided by Turnitin against other potential infringers is not worth the opportunity cost of the
forgone potential for exclusive licensing to Turnitin, see supra note 148 and accompanying text
(discussing the circular logic of claiming the defendant’s use as a potential market), or even to other
plagiarism detection services, which might not provide the same level of protection against future
infringement but could provide an immediate market for the work. Perhaps instead, as discussed
supra note 140 and accompanying text, the law would be willing to recognize a sale to other
students or term-paper mills for the purpose of cheating as a potential market. For the original
student who pursues those purposes and is acutely aware of the paper’s increased value if it is not
in Turnitin’s database, this market may also present a more valuable option than the “free”
protection passed over. In these scenarios, Turnitin’s use ceases to be enforcement on behalf of an
indifferent party. Instead, it deprives the student of the value of the exclusive rights by denying the
student the autonomy of determining the most valuable use of those rights. “It is not the role of the
courts to tell copyright holders the best way for them to exploit their copyrights,” Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447 n.28 (1984), so it is certainly not the role
of the secondary user to do just that by compelling a particular use and claiming that the offsetting
benefit to the copyright holder justifies finding an otherwise infringing use to be fair.
190. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
191. See supra notes 109–15 and accompanying text (discussing how archiving primarily
serves Turnitin’s economic goals).
192. Although plagiarism prevention certainly benefits the public, its benefits are purely
ethical and academic and are distinguishable from the goals of copyright. See supra notes 157–64
and accompanying text. The student work may serve a public purpose if used for plagiarism
detection, but “‘[t]he fair use doctrine is not a license for corporate theft, empowering a court to
ignore a copyright whenever it determines the underlying work contains material of possible public
importance.’” See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
(quoting Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir.
1980)).
193. “It is fundamentally at odds with the scheme of copyright to accord lesser rights in those
works that are of greatest importance to the public” because to “‘propose that fair use be imposed
whenever the social value [of dissemination] . . . outweighs any detriment to the artist, would be
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The second flaw in Turnitin’s premise is much more basic. Because of
the innate differences between those works that lie within the boundaries
of plagiarism and those works that lie within the boundaries of copyright
infringement,194 it is inappropriate to seek the former in an effort to collect
the latter. In other words, because it is possible to plagiarize without
offending copyright law,195 applying the rules of plagiarism to protect
copyrights from infringement will sweep too broad. Thus, a mechanism
that collects copyright-infringing works by looking for plagiarism
potentially sweeps within its ambit some works that are properly identified
as plagiarism but that nonetheless infringe no copyrights. Thus, this
mechanism inhibits works that, from the perspective of copyright law,
ought to be allowed.196
to propose depriving copyright owners of their right in the property precisely when they encounter
those users who could afford to pay for it.’” Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559 (alterations in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1600, 1615 (1982)). Despite facing potentially compelling social reasons, various courts have
nonetheless declined to expand the doctrine of fair use to create a public-figure exception, see id.
at 560; to create an exception based on newsworthiness, see Quinto v. Legal Times of Wash., Inc.,
506 F. Supp. 554, 560 (D.D.C. 1981); Roy Exp. Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,
503 F. Supp. 1137, 1143–44, 1148 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); or to create an exception for religious use, see
Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1115, 1121 (9th Cir.
2000).
194. See supra notes 157–65 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 158, 160–62 and accompanying text; see also supra note 184.
196. See supra notes 158, 160–62 and accompanying text; see also supra note 184.
Remembering that promoting creativity lies at the heart of copyright law, consider the thoughtprovoking piece by Malcolm Gladwell (his own previous work victimized by plagiarism), which,
hardly with an eye to the law, aptly zeroed in on the principal divergence between plagiarism and
copyright: “And this is the . . . problem with plagiarism. It is not merely extremist. It has also
become disconnected from the broader question of what does and does not inhibit
creativity. . . . The ethics of plagiarism have turned into the narcissism of small differences . . . .”
Malcolm Gladwell, Something Borrowed; Should a Charge of Plagiarism Ruin Your Life?, NEW
YORKER, Nov. 22, 2004, at 40, 47, available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/11/22/
041122fa_fact. Of the portion of his work that was plagiarized, Gladwell wrote, “It is difficult to
have pride of authorship in a sentence like that. My guess is that it’s a reworked version of
something I read in a textbook.” Id. at 47. Of the new work created with his words: “I found it
breathtaking. . . . [I]nstead of feeling that my words had been taken from me, I felt that they had
become part of some grander cause.” Id. at 42. In a reflection that at once seems both to parallel
fair use’s search for a transformative value in non-infringing uses and to underscore the differences
between plagiarism and copyright, he wrote:
Borrowing crosses the line when it is used for a derivative work. It’s one thing if
you’re writing a history of the Kennedys, like Doris Kearns Goodwin, and borrow,
without attribution, from another history of the Kennedys. But [the person who
copied my work wasn’t writing on the same subject]. She was writing a play about
something entirely new . . . . And she used my descriptions . . . as a building block
in making that . . . plausible. Isn’t that the way creativity is supposed to work? Old
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The third flaw in Turnitin’s premise, at least as it relates to Turnitin’s
specific use, concerns the restricting effect that this use has on original
authors. Faced with coerced acquiescence to a use of their work that many
students oppose on both moral and legal grounds, the prospect of
unnecessary self-censorship among students becomes a very real
possibility.197 Indeed, John Barrie has been quoted as telling instructors to
respond to students who express concern over misappropriation of their
intellectual property rights by explaining, “‘[W]rite as much creative stuff
as you want—just don’t do it at this institution.’”198 Such an attitude hardly
furthers “the underlying goal of the copyright statute, i.e., to promote
creativity.”199
Thus, contrary to Turnitin’s contention, archiving for the purpose of
plagiarism detection is antithetical to the goals of copyright law.200 First,
words in the service of a new idea aren’t the problem. What inhibits creativity is
new words in the service of an old idea.
Id. at 47.
197. With each additional level of disclosure this becomes more of a concern. Perhaps a
student with a brilliant idea would have no qualms writing about it if the student knew that the only
person to read the paper would be the student’s own teacher, whom the student trusted. But
knowing that any faceless and unknown teacher down the line who, even coincidentally, gets a
paper with a textual match may also be able to read this idea, the student may opt not to write about
it. Before casually discounting the creative ability of students, consider that Google, now one of
the most profitable and successful ideas of all time, began in Stanford University dorm rooms. See
Russ L. Juskalian, Google’s Evolution Makes a Great Story; Meticulous Research Brings Tale to
Life, USA TODAY, Sept. 12, 2005, at B6; see also Essayfraud.org, “Guilty Until Proven Innocent”:
Does Turnitin.com Profit from Students’ Actual Work?, Oct. 20, 2006,
http://www.essayfraud.org/turnitin_john_barrie.html#8 (“[M]ost great inventions spring from the
minds of our youth.”); cf. Essayfraud.org, “Guilty Until Proven Innocent”: Proof that Turnitin
Violates “Fair Use” by Destroying Marketability, Scenario #4, Oct. 20, 2006,
http://www.essayfraud.org/turnitin_john_barrie.html#7 (posing a hypothetical in which the idea for
Google is stolen through the use of Turnitin).
198. Andrea L. Foster, Plagiarism-Detection Tool Creates Legal Quandary, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), May 17, 2002, at A37 (quoting John Barrie, Turnitin’s founder), available
at http://chronicle.com/free/v48/i36/36a03701.htm.
199. Turnitin Legal Memo, supra note 154.
200. In addition to the problems already posed, Turnitin’s specific policy raises another issue.
Even assuming that plagiarism prevention should receive deferential fair use treatment or be
justified on general public-policy grounds (an assumption this Note strenuously discourages),
Turnitin’s use still raises a question of proportionality. Turnitin receives thousands of student
papers each day, see supra note 38, and the vast majority of these papers will presumably never be
plagiarized, see infra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing Turnitin’s primary value being
as a deterrent). If the rights of student authors are diminished for the corresponding benefit
Turnitin’s use will have on certain student authors or the general public, the use should be
somewhat more narrowly tailored to serve its purpose so as not to also diminish the rights in the
thousands of student papers that are never plagiarized. To properly evaluate whether Turnitin’s use
is justifiable, we need more data concerning how often student papers are plagiarized. The greater
the number of archived student papers that never legitimately flag other papers (archived student
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archiving enforces rights contrary to the wishes of the copyright owner.201
Second, it restricts subsequent use by second authors even of limited
recycled material,202 which might nonetheless be acceptable for copyright
purposes. Third, archiving encourages self-censorship by original
authors.203 Therefore, plagiarism prevention should not receive expanded
fair use protection.
D. Other Considerations
1. Consent
Turnitin strongly encourages its users to have students send their papers
directly to Turnitin, attempting to buttress legal arguments with student
consent.204 While alleviating some of the legal problems, this policy has
also been criticized,205 and questions remain whether students following
such directions actually consent to Turnitin’s use of their papers. For
example, the power dynamic between student and teacher casts doubt on
the voluntariness of any “consent” given by the former at the latter’s
instruction.206 Furthermore, even when students recognize their rights, they

papers that flag subsequent papers as false positives only compound the problem) and that lead to
detection of actual plagiarism, the less persuasive Turnitin’s arguments become.
201. See supra notes 179–93 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 194–96 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 197–99 and accompanying text.
204. See Turnitin Legal Memo, supra note 154 (“Having students submit their work, rather
than instructors . . . , adds one more level of consent on the part of the student, as nothing is done
without the student’s knowledge. We do not feel that this is required to meet the requirements of
fair use, but it certainly removes any ambiguity.”). Not surprisingly, the initial stages of the Turnitin
litigation in Virginia, see supra note 14, focused on issues related to consent and contract law,
which, if decided in Turnitin’s favor, could have absolved Turnitin without even reaching the
copyright issues. See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Vanderhye ex rel. A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC,
No. 07-0293 (E.D. Va. Apr. 26, 2007), available at http://www.dontturnitin.com./images/Motion_
to_Dismiss.pdf; Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Vanderhye ex rel. A.V.
v. iParadigms, LLC, No. 07-0293 (E.D. Va. May 7, 2007), available at
http://www.dontturnitin.com/images/turnitin_opposition.pdf. This Note, while briefly addressing
the often fact-specific issues related to consent and contract law, focuses primarily on the broader
and more legally significant copyright issues.
205. See Foster, supra note 198 (“The procedure, though, raises questions about whether
students feel coerced into submitting their papers to the service, and what would happen if they told
their professors that they objected to handing over their work because doing so would undermine
their legal rights.”); see also Michael Donnelly et al., (Mis)Trusting Technology that Polices
Integrity: A Critical Assessment of Turnitin.com; Why “Consent” May Not Be Sufficient, INVENTIO,
Fall 2006, available at http://www.doit.gmu.edu/inventio/issues/Fall_2006/Donnelly_13.html
(“[N]o, it’s not enough to put the uploading in the hands of students . . . and assume that they’ve
done so willingly and knowledgably.”).
206. As one teacher candidly admits:
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may acquiesce simply because the hassles they face in exercising them
make the game not worth the candle.207 Thus, having students submit
Though I did tell students from the beginning of the semester that the school
subscribes to and uses Turnitin.com, I think this hardly counts as acquiring their
permission to upload their writing to its database. Further, the power dynamic
itself involved in that first day of class, when a teacher attempts to put down the
proverbial foot and establish rules and expectations, doesn’t exactly open its doors
to students’ questions about the protection of their Intellectual Property. In
addition, many students don’t even understand fully the concept of Intellectual
Property, let alone realize that such protection exists.
Michael Donnelly et al., (Mis)Trusting Technology that Polices Integrity: A Critical Assessment
of Turnitin.com; The Concept of Intellectual Property, INVENTIO, Fall 2006, available at
http://www.doit.gmu.edu/inventio/issues/Fall_2006/Donnelly_11.html.
207. When a sophomore at McGill University in Montreal turned in essays directly to his
professor instead of following a mandatory policy that required students to submit to Turnitin, he
received failing grades. Grinberg, supra note 78. After the student appealed to the university senate
committee, the professor reluctantly graded the papers without submitting them to Turnitin. Id.
While the senate committee sided with the student, id., the student’s plight corroborates doubts
about the veracity of blindly equating direct student submission with consent. Perhaps the
effectiveness of consent should turn on whether the student is given other options. For example,
a teacher who intends to use Turnitin at the University of Hawaii West O’ahu must prominently
include the following statement, which makes consent a condition of class enrollment, in the class
syllabus:
UH West O’ahu has a license agreement with iParadigms, LLC for the use of
their plagiarism prevention and detection service popularly known as Turnitin.
Faculty may use Turnitin when reading and grading your assignments. By taking
a course where Turnitin is used, you agree that your assigned work may be
submitted to and screened by Turnitin. Turnitin rates work on originality based on
exhaustive searches of billions of pages from both current and archived instances
of the Internet, millions of student papers previously submitted to Turnitin, and
commercial databases of journal articles and periodicals. Turnitin does not make
a determination if plagiarism has taken place. It makes an assessment of the
submission’s originality and reports that to the course instructor. These Originality
Reports are tools to help your teacher locate potential sources of plagiarism in
submitted papers.
All papers submitted to Turnitin become part of Turnitin’s reference database
solely for the purpose of detecting plagiarism. Use of Turnitin is subject to the
Usage Policy as posted on the Turnitin.com web site.
See Plagiarism, Turnitin, and Academic Honesty for Faculty at UH West O’ahu,
http://socrates.uhwo.hawaii.edu/library/turnitin/turnitinfacultyinformation.html (last visited Nov.
15, 2007). By comparison, the University of North Carolina at Charlotte suggests that a teacher who
intends to use Turnitin place in the class syllabus the following language, which requires written
consent for submission to Turnitin and provides alternatives for those students who do not wish to
consent:
As a condition of taking this course, all required papers may be subject to
submission for textual similarity review to Turnitin.com for the detection of
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papers may provide some comfort, but it should not provide a false sense
of security that replaces a careful analysis of the legal issues that use of
Turnitin raises.208

plagiarism. All submitted papers will be included as source documents in the
Turnitin.com reference database solely for the purpose of detecting plagiarism of
such papers. No student papers will be submitted to Turnitin.com without a
student’s written consent and permission. If a student does not provide such
written consent and permission, the instructor may: (i) require a short reflection
paper on research methodology; (ii) require a draft bibliography prior to
submission of the final paper; or (iii) require the cover page and first cited page
of each reference source to be photocopied and submitted with the final paper.
See Univ. N.C. Charlotte, Suggested Standard Syllabus Policies, http://www.legal.uncc.edu/
syllabus.html#plagiarism (last visited Nov. 15, 2007).
208. Consent is not the only action schools have used to try to avoid legal concerns. Some
schools have specific guidelines that govern Turnitin use. For example, rather than submit all
student papers, Duke University suggests that its professors submit only papers that they suspect
might be plagiarized. See Foster, supra note 198. Although this approach may alleviate some of the
trust concerns associated with Turnitin, see infra note 239 and accompanying text, it provides little
help concerning the copyright issues. In fact, this approach creates a paradoxical result: if Turnitin
infringes student copyrights, then this approach adds salt to the wound by concentrating the harm
primarily among those students who are incorrectly accused or suspected of plagiarism.
Additionally, although Turnitin is merely supposed to flag suspicious material and leave the
ultimate plagiarism determination to the professor, see supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text,
this approach in effect reverses the roles, which increases the risk that a teacher will use Turnitin
as a crutch in lieu of a reasoned and independent plagiarism determination, see infra note 237.
Another policy (which again intimates that Turnitin’s user agreement is more forthright than
its Legal Document, see supra notes 130–33 and accompanying text) suggests that some schools
like the taste but not the way the sausage is made. The University of Hawai’i West O’ahu directs
faculty as follows:
Notice: Faculty at other institutions may discover a reference to one of your
student’s papers in the Turnitin database of student papers. If you receive a
request for a copy of a student paper, or permission to release a student paper, do
not permit its release. As a matter of privacy, we will not allow release of a UH
West O’ahu student’s work.
See Plagiarism, Turnitin, and Academic Honesty for Faculty at UH West O’ahu, supra note 207
(emphasis omitted).
Rather than beat around the bush, the University of Kansas, which considered canceling its
subscription to Turnitin due to high costs and copyright concerns, addressed its concerns more
directly. See Sophia Maines, KU Renews Anti-Plagiarism Software Subscription, LAWRENCE J.WORLD, Oct. 4, 2006, http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2006/oct/04/ku_renews_antiplagiarism_
software_subscription/. Before renewing its subscription, the University of Kansas made Turnitin
agree to remove student papers from the company’s database if requested by the KU Writing
Center, which administers Turnitin services for the school. See id. Ironically, by negotiating control
over archiving of student papers, KU may have made itself more vulnerable to a secondaryinfringement claim, see infra notes 213–16 and accompanying text, so the school would be wise
to use its option to remove student papers liberally.
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2. Should Student-Authored Papers Be Copyrightable?
As this Note emphasizes, copyright law provides the creator of a new
work, for a limited period, a set of exclusive rights to the work.209 That
raises the question, however, whether students, who are arguably amply
motivated by grades or other academic ends, need copyright protection as
an additional incentive to create.210 Despite the prevalence of similarly
situated authors who may have other incentives to create, copyright law
has steadily expanded,211 making it difficult to argue that student-authored
work is not copyrightable.
V. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS
A. Secondary Liability
Although the Copyright Act does not expressly provide for any liability
based on another’s infringement, “[t]he absence of such express language
in the copyright statute does not preclude the imposition of liability for
copyright infringements on certain parties who have not themselves
engaged in the infringing activity.”212 This indirect or secondary liability
can be found in the concepts of vicarious liability, which is appropriate in
“virtually all areas of the law,” and contributory infringement, which “is
merely a species of the broader problem of identifying the circumstances
in which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions of
another.”213 If Turnitin infringes copyrighted material, courts would need
209. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
210. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and
How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 541 (2004). “[T]here are numerous sources of creative
works that are produced without the incentive of copyright (though they might not be published and
distributed as effectively without copyright).” Id. Thus, due to “the many intangibles and unknowns
surrounding authorship, there is ample opportunity for debate about how to shape copyright law
to best further the creation and dissemination of expression.” Id.
211. See id.
212. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434–35 (1984).
213. Id. at 435. Note that there cannot be contributory infringement or vicarious liability
absent direct infringement. See Resnick v. Copyright Clearance Ctr., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 252,
257–58 (D. Mass. 2006); see also 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 66, § 12.04[D][1]
(acknowledging that because the exclusive right of authorization is not tied to actual infringement,
“one could argue that no further requirement exists of direct infringement” but opining that such
a conclusion is “overly facile,” and “it is more in keeping with traditional notions of third party
liability to confine the inquiry into whether there can be culpable participation in an infringement
to those instances when such infringement has in fact occurred”). These are not the exclusive forms
of secondary liability, however. In addition to a recognized concept of inducement liability, schools
should be aware that even if they avoid culpability under those methods of secondary infringement
that are already recognized, the schools are “not automatically out of the woods,” because
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to determine under what circumstances, if any, liability should extend to
schools or teachers who use the system. Although the lines between the
two concepts are not clearly drawn,214 contributory infringement generally
arises when one induces or encourages direct infringement,215 while
vicarious infringement generally arises when one profits from direct
infringement and declines to exercise a right to stop or limit the
infringement.216 Because schools adopt different internal policies regarding
Turnitin and retain different levels of control over student papers,217 it is
difficult to generalize the prospects of a successful suit for secondary
liability. But the potential class of defendants should, at the very least, be
aware of the possibility of such a suit.
B. Fiduciary Duties
Independent of secondary infringement, a school addressing the
plagiarism problem must also carefully determine whether it owes students
fiduciary duties and, if it does, be careful not to run afoul of those duties.218

“[n]othing forecloses yet another doctrine from arising in future cases where appropriate analogy
to common law can fill the gaps left by existing species of secondary liability.” 3 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 66, § 12.04[A][5][a].
214. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 n.17.
215. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005)
(citing Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971)).
216. See id. (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir.
1963)).
217. See supra note 208. The more control a school has over student papers and the more
direct its connection to Turnitin, the greater its potential for exposure to secondary liability. See 3
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 66, § 12.04[A][2] (explaining that the ability to supervise the
infringing activity is an element of vicarious liability); id. § 12.04[A][3] (noting that contributory
infringement can be conduct that furthers or forms part of infringing activity).
218. “A fiduciary is one whose function it is to act for the benefit of another as to matters
relevant to the relation between them.” See Warren A. Seavey, Commentary, Dismissal of Students:
“Due Process,” 70 HARV. L. REV. 1406, 1407 n.3 (1957). One view suggests that “because schools
exist primarily for the education of their students, it is obvious that professors and administrators
act in a fiduciary capacity with reference to the students.” Id. Nonetheless, “Assertions that
educators have fiduciary duties continue to be controversial. The teacher–student relationship is not
a ‘formal fiduciary relationship,’ but a number of courts have held that this relationship rises to the
level of an ‘informal fiduciary relationship’ in a variety of contexts and circumstances.” Brett G.
Scharffs & John W. Welch, An Analytical Framework for Understanding and Evaluating the
Fiduciary Duties of Educators, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 159, 229. Explaining the difference
between informal and formal fiduciary relationships, Scharffs and Welch wrote:
Cases involving breach of fiduciary duty often distinguish between formal and
informal fiduciary relationships, and the magnitude of duty owed in informal
fiduciary relationships tends to be lower. To the extent that a fiduciary
relationship is found to exist between educators and students, we would expect
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This task requires schools to strike a delicate balance because courts have
been asked to hold educational institutions or teachers liable for fiduciary
duties both related to using student intellectual property and related to
grading and evaluating students.219 Thus, because litigation could ensue
from either overly aggressive plagiarism prosecution without due regard
to student copyrights or from apathy to the plagiarism problem such that
proper grading and evaluation is compromised, teachers and
administrators, in determining the proper course of conduct, would be wise
to consider carefully whether they are acting as fiduciaries and, if so, what
their fiduciary duties entail.220
C. A New Market
Judge Posner predicts that because technology like Turnitin makes
plagiarism easier to detect, “[w]e may be entering the twilight of
plagiarism.”221 He suggests that although Turnitin’s technology is
relatively new and underutilized at this point, in time would-be publishers
may begin using Turnitin or similar systems to ensure that they are not
publishing plagiarized work.222 In addition to providing valuable new
clients, this market could provide Turnitin a source for another database.
One of the major limitations of Turnitin’s current database is that it cannot

courts to evaluate those situations under rubrics applicable to informal fiduciary
relationships, in which case courts would be expected to focus upon factors such
as whether there was an especially high degree of reliance and trust, an unusual
amount of power, or particular vulnerability on the part of the beneficiary.
Id. at 178–79.
219. See Scharffs & Welch, supra note 218, at 161. Admittedly, most of the intellectualproperty issues concern patents, not copyrights, see id. at 223–26, and courts have been reluctant
to find fiduciary duties relative to grading, see id. at 219–22, yet educators would still be wise to
address these potential issues.
220. For a comprehensive overview of the concept of educators as fiduciaries and a helpful
framework for analyzing potential issues therein, see generally Scharffs & Welch, supra note 218.
221. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 86.
222. Id. at 85–86. As examples of published plagiarism become more prevalent—recent
examples include writings by Kaavya Viswanathan, Doris Kearns Goodwin, and Stephen
Ambrose—consternation among publishers is certainly understandable. See id. at 91. Six
publishers, for example, recently agreed to allow their full-text content to be indexed for the pilot
run of a cross-publisher plagiarism detection service to be known as CrossCheck. Press Release,
Cross Ref, Crossref Pilots Cross-Publisher Plagiarism Detection Service (Aug. 1, 2007), available
at http://www.crossref.org/01company/pr/press080107.htm. CrossRef, a non-profit membership
association of publishers, and iParadigms are working together to develop CrossCheck Id.
CrossCheck is marketed as a tool that “allows scholarly and professional publishers to verify the
originality of submitted and published works.” Id. Thus, as the plagiarism prevention and detection
industry grows, both for Turnitin and others, the implications of deferential fair use treatment for
plagiarism prevention and detection loom larger. See supra Part IV.C.3.
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check against books that are not online.223 But if publishers began running
prospective works through Turnitin before publication, Turnitin could
simply add those works—and their digital fingerprints—to a new database.
Thus, Turnitin’s database-compilation methodology has the potential to
sweep far beyond the academic world.
D. Ramifications of the “Turnitin Culture”
Looking more broadly, the “Turnitin Culture” may present another
issue regardless of which way the copyright issues are resolved. Professor
Lisa Maruca suggests that both Turnitin’s view of its proprietary databases
and students’ view of their intellectual property being misappropriated are
misguided.224 Both of these views “construct[] writing as fundamentally,
perhaps primarily, a commodity in a market economy, subject to the laws
of intellectual property.”225 This is part of a Turnitin Culture that creates
a “crime and punishment” environment where “every key phrase or
language string is viewed as a potential act of piracy that must be
traced.”226 If this atmosphere, which demands the utmost originality and
invariable attribution, extends to other domains, it could erode the concept
of fair use and consequently extend the domain of copyright.227 Thus,
“increased vigilance over source use that results because of and as part of
the plagiarism panic also works to actually increase the domain of
copyright, extending its reach by working to limit fair use and
commercialize texts not usually considered part of the market
economy.”228 The corollary of this argument is that whenever copyright is
extended, the extension comes at the expense of the public domain.229 But
this dwindling of the public domain comes without a corresponding benefit
because “texts not usually considered part of the market economy”230
should not need the added economic incentive of exclusivity to stimulate
production.

223. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 85; see also infra note 238.
224. See Maruca, supra note 160, at 8.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.; see also supra notes 194–96 and accompanying text (discussing the potentially more
stringent tenets of plagiarism detection services than of copyright law).
228. See Maruca, supra note 160, at 8. Professor Maruca, who argues that “plagiarism is much
more than ‘merely academic,’” advocates viewing the recent plagiarism panic in the context of “the
increasingly restrictive global culture of copyright.” Id. Because of the ease with which its moral
and ethical underpinnings are invoked, the plagiarism panic might best be classified as the
“propaganda wing of the corporate copyright wars.” Id.
229. See Lessig, supra note 161, at 764; see also supra note 54 and accompanying text.
230. See Maruca, supra note 160, at 8.
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VI. EFFECTIVENESS
A more basic question has been lurking in the background of this
Note’s discussion of the various legal issues surrounding Turnitin: How
effective is Turnitin? The question is certainly pertinent in evaluating
Turnitin’s usefulness as a solution to the plagiarism problem posed in Part
II. But this simple question is also more important to a legal analysis than
one might initially realize because Turnitin’s effectiveness is intricately
intertwined with its legality. For example, the effectiveness of Turnitin
correlates with the persuasiveness of its fair use argument.231 Likewise,
academic institutions that use Turnitin and face issues related to secondary
infringement232 or fiduciary obligations233 benefit legally from an effective
Turnitin system.
Turnitin has had its share of success both as a plagiarism detection
service and as a tool that leads to better writing.234 Some feel that its value
as a detection tool is surpassed by its even greater value as a deterrent.235
231. In its hybrid commercial and educational capacity, Turnitin should focus on its
educational aspects as much as possible. See supra notes 107–10 and accompanying text. This
becomes easier if Turnitin can demonstrate its educational benefits, which directly depend on its
system’s effectiveness. Conversely, if Turnitin fails to meet its educational goals, its appropriation
of student works becomes less beneficial to society and less characteristic of fair use.
232. Because there cannot be contributory infringement or vicarious liability absent direct
infringement, see supra note 213 and accompanying text, the persuasiveness of the fair use
argument, which is affected by Turnitin’s effectiveness, see supra note 231 and accompanying text,
is likewise important to the potential secondary infringer.
233. If fiduciary obligations of accurate grading and safeguarding intellectual property exist
and clash with each other, see supra notes 218–19 and accompanying text, a school that uses
Turnitin should justify its use by emphasizing its obligation to grade accurately and by
demonstrating Turnitin’s value in achieving that objective. This justification necessarily collapses
if Turnitin is ineffective and thus fails to actually promote accurate grading.
234. See Turnitin, Success Stories, http://turnitin.com/static/success.html (last visited Nov. 15,
2007); see also Turnitin, Testimonials, http://turnitin.com/static/testimonials.html (last visited Nov.
15, 2007).
235. See Using Turnitin.com: A Guide for Instructors at Indiana University Bloomington,
http://www.indiana.edu/~iss/publications/tii_pamph_0507.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2007)
(“Turnitin.com is most effective as a deterrent . . . .”); TURNITIN, INSTRUCTOR USER GUIDE, supra
note 133, at 18 (“Although Originality Reports can be very effective at helping to identify
suspected individual cases of plagiarism, Turnitin plagiarism prevention works even more
powerfully when used as a deterrent.”); see also Todd Ackerman, Colleges’ War Against Cheats
Goes High-Tech; Computers Used to Fight Rising Internet Plagiarism, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 6,
2003, at A1 (quoting John Barrie as saying, “What institutions like about Turnitin.com is that our
database is so massive it serves as an extremely effective deterrent.”). Of course, this also serves
as yet another example of the importance of the massive database to the Turnitin system. Cf. supra
notes 112–13 and accompanying text. One must wonder, however, if implicit in the commendation
of Turnitin’s ability to deter is a condemnation of its detection service. See Shelly Savage, Staff and
Student Responses to a Trial of Turnitin Plagiarism Detection Software, 2004 AUSTRALIAN U.
QUALITY F., http://www.auqa.com.au/auqf/2004/program/papers/Savage.pdf (evaluating student
and staff responses to an experimental run of Turnitin and determining that those responses indicate
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But others question its effectiveness. Some question whether Turnitin’s
traditional use as a policing tool neglects the learning process.236 Others
point to the potential for inappropriate reliance on Turnitin,237 which is

that Turnitin is “a useful but limited tool for combating Internet-assisted plagiarism,” that “Turnitin
is thought to be most useful as a deterrent rather than as a solution to Internet-assisted plagiarism,
and that it would be wise to concurrently pursue other methods to reduce the problem of plagiarism
in higher education”).
236. See Ashlee Monroe, Prof Tries Out Teaching, Anti-Cheating Web Site, ATHENS NEWS
(Athens, Ohio), Feb. 1, 2007, http://www.athensnews.com/issue/article.php3?story_id=27233.
237. Because Turnitin provides only data, not a determination of guilt or innocence, see supra
notes 50–51 and accompanying text, faculty review of student papers remains critical. See JOHNS
HOPKINS CTR. FOR EDUC. RES., DETERRING AND DETECTING PLAGIARISM WITH TURNITIN.COM
(2006), available at http://www.cer.jhu.edu/presentations/tiitips.pdf. For example, because “a
match is a match,” Turnitin will flag even properly quoted material. See id. In this regard, Turnitin
is comparable to a spell checker—a valuable tool that does not obviate the need for human review.
See id. As one critic concluded, detection services such as Turnitin are useful as a tool and deterrent
but far from comprehensive: “The human element remains vital, and without further investigation
of their findings, both positive and negative, innocent students stand to be accused of plagiarism
and guilty students could still get away with it. Plagiarism services are a tool, but caveat emptor,
buyer beware!” John Royce, Has Turnitin.com Got It All Wrapped Up? (Trust or Trussed?), TCHR.
LIBR., Apr. 1, 2003, at 26, 30. The comparison to a spell checker and the potential pitfalls of using
Turnitin as a crutch to replace an independent and critical analysis bring to mind the witty poem
designed to highlight the parallel pitfalls of using a spell checker as such a crutch:
Eye halve a spelling chequer,
It came with my pea sea.
It plainly marques four my revue
Miss steaks eye kin knot sea.
Eye strike a key and type a word,
And weight four it two say
Weather eye am wrong oar write;
It shows me strait a weigh.
As soon as a mist ache is maid,
It nose bee fore two long,
An eye can put the error rite;
Its rare lea ever wrong.
Eye have run this poem threw it.
I am shore your pleased two no
Its letter perfect awl the weigh.
My chequer tolled me sew.
Hev uh gud dae, furenz!
The Mysteries of a Spell Checker, available at Virginia Tech Department of Computer Science
Web Site, http://courses.cs.vt.edu/~cs3604/support/Writing/Spell.Checker.html (last visited Nov.
15, 2007). Yet some continue to overemphasize Turnitin results. For example, in one school, no
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augmented by the natural limitations of Turnitin’s methodology.238 Others
argue that, even factoring in the effect on plagiarism, Turnitin still has a
negative net effect on academia because it “cultivates a culture of distrust
between professors and students.”239 In sum, Turnitin’s effectiveness is
debatable. To the extent Turnitin’s methodology is ineffective, Turnitin
fails to solve the plagiarism problem, compromising the company’s legal
position.
VII. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE PLAGIARISM PROBLEM
Those concerned with the effectiveness, legality, or ethicality of
Turnitin’s system hardly need to tolerate plagiarism. Retired English
professor Robert Harris240 offers several strategies to combat plagiarism.241
These strategies focus on three areas: awareness, prevention, and
detection.242 Awareness can help prevent plagiarism by attacking its causes
and by explaining to students why it is important to do their own work.243
Plagiarism prevention is a strategy that seeks to make unique assignments
matter how strong a professor’s suspicions of plagiarism, the professor may not act unless the paper
was first flagged by Turnitin. See Phil Baty, Litigation Fear Lets Cheats off Hook, TIMES HIGHER
EDUC. SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 13, 2006, at 56.
238. Because Turnitin cannot detect ideas, it can miss extensive paraphrasing; because
Turnitin’s detection is limited to its databases, it cannot detect offline material not otherwise
represented in a Turnitin database; and because of the same database limitation, it often cannot
detect papers purchased from term-paper mills. See JOHNS HOPKINS CTR. FOR EDUC. RES., supra
note 237. For a discussion of the history of term-paper mills and the failure of judicial efforts to
curtail them, see generally Darby Dickerson, Facilitated Plagiarism: The Saga of Term-Paper Mills
and the Failure of Legislation and Litigation to Control Them, 52 VILL. L. REV. 21 (2007).
239. See Brock Read, Turnitin Makes Its Ivy League Debut, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. ONLINE,
Nov. 3, 2006, http://chronicle.com/wiredcampus/article/1688/turnitin-makes-its-ivy-league-debut.
This negative effect is likely magnified by the double standard in academia, whereby student
plagiarists are dealt with much more harshly than professor plagiarists. See POSNER, supra note 6,
at 89–90. For example, in contrast to the stiff penalties imposed on student plagiarists, see supra
note 6 and accompanying text, when a historian at the University of Chicago was found to have
plagiarized a book review written by a graduate student, his “censure took the curious form of
barring him from teaching graduate students for five years. (Undergraduates were indignant!),”
POSNER, supra note 6, at 31.
240. About Robert A. Harris, http://www.virtualsalt.com/bioblurb.htm (last visited Nov. 15,
2007). Professor Harris wrote a comprehensive book on plagiarism. See ROBERT A. HARRIS, THE
PLAGIARISM HANDBOOK: STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTING, DETECTING, AND DEALING WITH
PLAGIARISM (2001).
241. See Robert Harris, Anti-Plagiarism Strategies for Research Papers, VIRTUALSALT, Nov.
17, 2004, http://www.virtualsalt.com/antiplag.htm.
242. Id.
243. Id. From the instructor’s perspective, plagiarism awareness requires understanding both
why students cheat and how they cheat. Id. From the student’s perspective, plagiarism awareness
means students must receive both a clear definition of plagiarism and an unambiguous recitation
of the penalties for plagiarizing. Id. Students should also be aware of the benefits of citing sources.
Id.
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that only original papers will be able to satisfy.244 If both awareness and
prevention fail to preemptively combat plagiarism, detection provides the
final safeguard.245
VIII. CONCLUSION
Plagiarism is a growing problem that evades a simple solution.
Academic institutions must, in the interests of fairness, academic integrity,
and scholastic progress, do all they can to prevent, detect, and deter
plagiarism. Counteracting plagiarism, which concerns the writing process,
promotes ethical behavior and fosters a culture of academic trust. It is thus
important for anti-plagiarism mechanisms likewise to be ethical and to
foster academic trust. Turnitin, a solution to the plagiarism problem
popular among academic institutions, infringes students’ copyrights.
Turnitin’s key selling point, its massive database, is largely the product of
archiving and copying of student-authored works. Both copyright law and
copyright policy—the latter differing substantially from plagiarismprevention policy—dictate that this archiving is not a fair use and infringes
copyrighted works. Thus, to the extent that lack of concern for—and
indeed mandated infringement of—student copyrights is unethical and
fosters distrust in the academic community, use of the Turnitin system is
counterproductive to the objectives of plagiarism prevention and is both
an inappropriate and an ineffective remedy. Schools that use Turnitin also
expose themselves to potential liability. Therefore, schools must seek
alternative solutions to the plagiarism problem.

244. Id. Professor Harris offers the following suggestions: be clear about expectations and
requirements for the assignment; provide a list of specific topics from which students must choose;
require a specific research makeup; assign the paper in various stages with specific due dates;
require students to give oral reports of their papers, which should include responding to questions
about the research process, not just the content; require an annotated bibliography; accept only upto-date references; and require students to write an in-class essay about their writing experience.
Id. Even if these suggestions could not all reasonably be implemented at the university level, taking
those individual measures that are practical would still help curb plagiarism.
245. Id. In this final category, Professor Harris has a number of recommendations: looking for
clues of plagiarism (for example, mixed citation formats, unusual formatting, or inconsistent style
or diction); keeping abreast of popular term-paper mills; using Internet search engines to check for
plagiarism; and using commercial detection tools (Plagiarism.org, see supra notes 35–36 and
accompanying text, is on Professor Harris’s list). Harris, supra note 241.
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